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ABSTRACT 
 Industrial control systems (ICS) regulate and monitor critical cyber-physical 
systems such as the power grid and manufacturing plants. ICS networks are also 
vulnerable to cyber attacks, and existing defenses against these attacks are similar to 
those employed by traditional network intrusion detection systems (IDS). However, a 
typical IDS may not detect semantic attacks on the physical end devices because they 
follow the protocol specifications to bypass the IDS signatures. Sequence-based attacks, a 
subset of semantic attacks, can manipulate the ordering of valid commands to cause 
unsafe conditions for the physical devices. Based on a previous method of detecting 
sequence-based attacks by using discrete-time Markov chains (DTMC) to model normal 
ICS network traffic, we implemented a DTMC model for the EtherNet/IP and CIP 
industrial protocols and observed its effectiveness at recognizing sequence-based attacks. 
We developed four additional methods for DTMC model creation and compared their 
ability to detect attacks that the previous method failed to observe. All methods 
successfully identified attacks causing invalid states or invalid transitions, and only two 
methods could find localized anomalies. The results confirmed that a DTMC-based 
sequence-aware IDS could help improve the security posture of national critical 
infrastructure and Department of the Navy control systems. 
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Industrial control system (ICS) is a term used to describe a category of systems that 
monitor and control aspects of an industrial process. They are used to regulate power 
generation and distribution, allow automation of manufacturing processes, and allow 
operators to quickly respond to unexpected changes in industrial processes [1]. Although 
ICS is not a new development, advances in networking have led to great levels of 
standardization within ICS components as well as the desire to connect previously isolated 
ICS networks with traditional information technology (IT) systems [2]. While this has 
brought many benefits, it has also made it easier for adversaries to conduct cyber-based 
attacks that have serious consequences in the real-world. Once such example is the attack 
in 2015 that resulting in the temporary shutdown on portions of the power grid in  
Ukraine [3]. 
This thesis developed four methods to detect potentially destructive attacks against 
ICS using the EtherNet/IP (ENIP) and Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) communications 
protocols. Each of these methods is a variation on how a sequence-aware intrusion 
detection system (IDS) builds observation models to compare against the training model. 
Sequence-aware IDSs are able to use the information contained network communications 
to model the operation of the ICS’s physical components, and can detect cyber-attacks that 
would result in damage to the physical components [4]. The network data that contain 
information about the physical sensors and actuators of an ICS are used as input to a 
discreet-time Markov chain (DTMC), resulting in a model that reflects the order in which 
the physical components operate. This observation model can be compared to a model 
generated from known correct operation, and differences between the two will alert system 
operators to potential cyber-attacks. We showed how a previous method used to process 
the observed traffic into the DTMC model can cause the IDS to fail to detect attacks, and 
proposed four new traffic processing methods that aim to successfully detect as many 
different types of attacks as possible.  
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first prototype of a sequence-aware 
IDS for ICS using the ENIP/CIP communication protocols. ENIP/CIP are a pair of 
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protocols developed by ODVA Inc, and are widely used in ICS networks [5]. Our prototype 
shows that it is possible to develop a DTMC-based sequence-aware IDS for different ICS 
protocols. 
A. MOTIVATION 
Like traditional networks, ICS are vulnerable to attacks that exploit flaws in 
communications protocols and data plane manipulation. However, they are also vulnerable 
to attacks that place the physical system in an unsafe condition. These sematic attacks [6] 
require in-depth knowledge of the system being controlled in order to exploit the physical 
system from the network. A careful sematic attack can manipulate the industrial process to 
disastrous effect. The most well-known semantic attack is STUXNET, where malware 
infected the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in an Iranian uranium enrichment 
facility and changed the operating speed for the centrifuges, leading to repeated damage of 
the machinery [7].  
Sequence-based attacks, a form of semantic attacks, send valid commands over the 
ICS network to evade detection, but exploit the ordering of those commands to place the 
physical system in an unsafe condition [8]. A traditional intrusion detection system (IDS) 
filters network packets for unusual parameters to identify malicious traffic. However, 
sequence-based attacks will not use any unusual packets and will therefore not be detected 
by a traditional IDS [7]. Detecting a sequence-based attack requires a behavior-based 
intrusion detection system that can understand how each observed network packet will 
affect the physical system, and compare the observed behavior to the known behavior of 
the physical system [4]. In [4], Casseli et al. proposed such an IDS, using Discreet-Time 
Markov Chains (DTMC) to create a model of known commands and the probabilities of 
how they are ordered. However, it is possible that the implementation of how the observed 
data is compared to the training model described in [4] could fail to detect attacks that only 
occur over a short time frame. Additionally, their sequence-aware IDS has only been 
implemented on networks using the Modbus and IEC 60870-5-104 protocols [4], [9]. 
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B. RESEARCH PLAN 
This thesis implements a sequence-aware IDS on an ICS that uses the ENIP/CIP 
protocols, and proposes four new method of processing observed traffic into the IDS’s 
DTMC model. This was accomplished by implementing the following research plan. 
First, an ICS platform for implementing the IDS was identified and the ICS’s 
normal operation observed. Our Industrial Control System Instructional Cybersecurity Lab 
(ICSICL) was chosen as the target platform. The behavior of the ICSICL’s 
communications between the programmable logic controller (PLC) and human-machine 
interface (HMI) system was analyzed to develop a parser that extract relevant commands 
from the observed traffic. Next, a baseline operating procedure for the ICSICL physical 
components was developed. This was used as the known “normal” operating conditions 
from which subsequent attacks deviate. Third, a sequence-aware IDS supporting the 
proposed processing methods was implemented. Fourth, fifteen different test plans were 
developed, each using different attacks that differed from the normal operating procedure 
in a different way, and each testing the IDS’s ability to detect different types of deviations 
between the known normal procedure and the attack. Finally, these test scenarios were run, 
and the IDS’s ability to detect each attack was recorded and analyzed.  
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remaining chapters are organized as follows. Chapter II provides background 
information on the ENIP/CIP protocols and the current state of sequence aware IDS 
implementation. In Chapter III, we discuss the ICS testbed used in this thesis and how its 
specific implementation of the ENIP/CIP protocols affects our DTMC models. Chapter IV 
describes the implemented anomaly detection methods, their test plans, and the simulated 
attacks used to evaluate the effectiveness of each method. Chapter V presents an analysis 
of the test results. Lastly, Chapter VI summarizes our contributions and discusses possible 
directions for future research. 
4 
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
This chapter provides background on the ENIP and CIP protocols, definitions and 
history of semantic-based attacks, Markov chain generation, and a summary of previous 
work relating to using Markov chains to detect attacks against industrial control systems. 
 
A. ETHERNET/IP AND CIP PROTOCOLS 
Traditionally, ICS network protocols were created to be optimized for specific 
applications with severe computing limitations. This resulted in a multitude of network 
protocols that could execute their intended tasks well but lacked interoperability [10]. 
However, as the benefits of fully interoperable systems became more apparent, industrial 
protocols that can run on many different types of network hardware have emerged. The 
Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), developed by ODVA Inc., is one of these  
solutions [10]. It is a common application-layer protocol that can be used with four 
different network stacks as shown in Figure 1. EtherNet/IP (ENIP) provides CIP 
implementations over traditional TCP/IP networks, and is compatible with both TCP and 
UDP transport protocols [11]. DeviceNet, CompoNet, and ControlNet are CIP 
implementations over other proprietary protocols used in industrial control networks.  
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Figure 1. CIP network implementation options. Source: [10] 
1. Ethernet/IP Protocol 
When implementing CIP on ENIP, the transportation-layer payload consists of an 
ENIP encapsulation header followed by a variable-length payload that allows for multiple 
CIP commands to be sent in a single ENIP packet. Figure 2 shows the network stack of an 
industrial network running ENIP and CIP. 
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Figure 2. ENIP and CIP implementation on the network stack 
The ENIP protocol provides the important bridge between TCP and CIP by 
organizing CIP commands in a standard way that can be parsed by any TCP-aware devices. 
In order to accomplish this, an ENIP packet consists of an encapsulation header that 
provides basic information about how the encapsulated commands should be handled, and 
a command-specific payload. The ENIP encapsulation header consists of 24 bytes as shown 
in Table 1. 





∑ Command: Contains one of nine possible ENIP commands, consisting of 
various ways to set up connection and transmit CIP data. The data 
captures examined for this thesis exclusively uses the SendUnitData 
command. 
∑ Length: The number of bytes of the encapsulated data. 
∑ Session Handle: A unique identifier for the ENIP communication session. 
∑ Status: A value set by the receiver to indicate whether or not the receiver 
was able to execute the ENIP command. A zero indicates successful 
execution.  
∑ Sender Context:  A unique identifier that can be set by the sender of the 
command to identify specific elements in a session. Use of this field is 
optional, and is not implemented in the ICS testbed. 
∑ Options: Command-specific optional flags [12].  
The ENIP header does not explicitly distinguish between a request and a reply. This 
distinction must be made implicitly by observing the ENIP command and its context or 
explicitly by observing the contents of the encapsulated payload. Table 2 shows the 
encapsulation header and command-specific values for the SendUnitData command, which 
is the only ENIP encapsulation command used by the ICSICL system that is relevant for 
this thesis. 
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Table 2. Encapsulation header and command data for SendUnitData 
command. Adapted from [12]. 
 
 
The SendUnitData ENIP encapsulation command type, as well as many others, use 
the Common Packet Format (CPF) [12], which defines a standard way for encapsulating 
CIP data. The protocol definition for the CPF header and CPF Item structure are shown in 
Table 3 and Table 4. 




Table 4. CPF item specification. Adapted from [12]. 
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The CPF header provides an extendable format for the encapsulation of multiple 
messages for higher-level protocols. Encapsulated messages are organized into CPF items 
that provide identification of the encapsulated protocol, data length, and message data. The 
Type ID field of a CPF item further identifies the purpose of the encapsulated data found 
in the data section of the CPF item. Type IDs are either address items or data items [12]. 
An address item provides addressing information for the encapsulated protocol, e.g., 
whether the protocol is a connection-oriented or not. A data item provides an encapsulation 
for exchanges of data. The data field of an CFP item contains the encapsulated command 
for the higher-level protocol, specifically CIP. 
2. Common Industrial Protocol 
CIP uses object modeling to describe communication services, externally visible 
behavior, and methods for accessing data. A CIP node is modeled as a set of objects, and 
objects are structured into classes, instances, and attributes.  
A class is a description of a set of the same component type, and an instance is a 
specific object in that class. Each class has its own set of attributes, and each instance of a 
class has its own values for the class attributes [13]. The CIP specification [13] includes 
publicly-defined classes, and any implementations that use these classes must follow the 
specification. The CIP specification also allows vendors to define their own proprietary 
classes.  
CIP uses the following addressing format to uniquely identify components [13]: 
∑ Node Address: The network address of a CIP node. For ENIP this is the IP 
address.  
∑ Class Identifier (Class ID): A unique identification value assigned to each 
object class on the network.  
∑ Instance Identifier (Instance ID): A unique identification value assigned to 
each instance within a class.  
11 
∑ Attribute Identifier (Attribute ID): A unique identification value for each 
attribute within an instance or class.  
∑ Service Code: A value that denotes an action request that is directed at a 
particular object instance or attribute. The service codes for publicly-
defined classes can be found in [13].  
The CIP specification defines many different class identifiers for objects that are 
common in an industrial control system, such as types of sensors and actuators as well as 
connection types with different levels of quality of service [13]. The service codes assigned 
to a class and the commands and responses associated with those codes define the 
behaviors of the particular class. However, CIP also enables vendors to use vendor-specific 
class and service codes to provide custom behavior for their products. The in-house 
ICSICL testbed makes use of Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation ControlLogix 
Programable Logic Controllers [14] and Rockwell Automation Studio 5000 Logix 
Designer [14] as the controlling program. The CIP implementation used in the testbed uses 
vendor-defined classes and service codes for all data transmission, therefore limiting the 
usefulness of the available CIP documentation for understanding how data is transmitted. 
Some components of these vendor-defined classes and service codes are discussed in 
Chapter III.  
B. MARKOV CHAINS 
A stochastic process is considered a Markov process if in each state, the future state 
is only dependent on the present state, and independent of any of the past states. This is 
referred to as the Markov property [15]. If this property exists in a stochastic process that 
has a finite number of states, it is referred to as a Markov Chain, and if the stochastic 
process also represents time as a discrete process, it is a Discreet-Time Markov Chain 
(DTMC). A DTMC consists of a finite amount of states and transitions between those 
states. Every state must have at least one transition out of that state, but states can transition 
to themselves. Additionally, each transition has an associated probability the governs the 
likelihood of that transition being chosen as the process moves to the next state. A common 
12 
method of representing a Markov chain graphically is via a state-transition diagram.  
Figure 3 shows a state-transition diagram for a simple DTMC.  
 
Figure 3. State-transition diagram for a basic DTMC 
Each state in a DTMC must have at least one transition leaving that state, and the 
summation of the probabilities for all transition leaving a given state must be one. In 
addition to the graphical state-transition diagram, a DTMC can be expressed with a 
transition probability matrix, as seen in Table 5. 
Table 5. Transition probability matric for DTMC shown in Figure 3 
 
 
A transition probability matrix is a N x N matrix where n is the number of states in 
the DTMC. Each row in the matrix represents the current state, and the columns represent 
the possible states to transition to. Every entry shows the transition probability for the 
transition from I to J, where I is the row and J is the column. Transition probability matrices 
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offer a way to mathematically describe a DTMC, and are used to compare DTMCs among 
each other [15]. 
C. SEMANTIC ATTACKS 
Like traditional networks, industrial networks are vulnerable to attacks that exploit 
flaws in communications protocols and data plane manipulation. However, they are also 
vulnerable to attacks that place the physical system in an unsafe condition. These are called 
semantic attacks [16].  
Semantic attacks require in-depth knowledge of the system being controlled in 
order to exploit the physical system, but a careful attack can manipulate the industrial 
process to disastrous effect. The most well-known semantic attack is STUXNET, where 
malware infected the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in an Iranian uranium 
enrichment facility and changed the operating speed for the centrifuges, leading to repeated 
damage of the machinery [7]. Detection methods for semantic attacks follows the 
traditional network defense framework of knowing normal activity and then identifying 
abnormal activity, but instead of focusing on packet construction or communication 
patterns, they need to understand the underlying physical process and how network traffic 
can affect that process. One approach is to identify critical setpoints stored in a PLC and 
monitor attempts to change those values. This can be achieved either by direct knowledge 
of the plant or by implementing a training phase into the algorithm to identify normal 
behavior of a category of PLC variables. However, the scalability of this approach is 
limited due to the significant manual inspection required to identify the data type and 
memory location of critical variables in proprietary implementation of PLCs [16]. 
D. SEQUENCE-AWARE INTRUSION DETECTION 
A sequence-based attack against an ICS is a type of semantic attack that is designed 
to cause physical damage to the ICS by causing valid events to occur in an improper order. 
For example, the command “drain tank #1” could be a valid operation, but it should only 
be done after a desired flow path has been established. A sequence-based attack could cause 
the “drain tank #1” command to be sent at an improper time, which could result in tank #1 
draining to an undesired location. Making an effective sequence-based attack against an 
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ICS requires detailed knowledge about the industrial process the ICS is controlling, 
including knowing which network commands to send at what time to place the underlying 
process into an unsafe state. However, these commands can be difficult for traditional 
network monitoring intrusion detection systems to detect because they are well-formed 
legitimate commands.  
Common IDS systems compare packet header and payload data while monitoring 
against either a black-list of known malicious signatures, or a white-list of acceptable 
network behavior, i.e., stateful deep packet inspection [6]. This approach is not sufficient 
for detecting a sequence-based attack, as the attack is delivered by correctly-constructed 
network packets containing a valid command for one or more of the actuators in the ICS. 
Therefore, an IDS that can understand the effect of the observed commands on the 
underlying industrial process, and recognize deviation from the process is needed.  
In [4] M. Casseli et al. showed how an IDS could do this by building a DTMC to 
model the states of the industrial process and transitions between the states. A state S is 
defined by the 5-tuple <Data, Type, #Elements, FTS, LTS> where: 
∑ Data: uniquely identifies S and describes the portion of information that its 
events share with each other. 
∑ Type: indicates if S represents elements that include request/response 
pairs, only request, or only responses. 
∑ #Elements: the number of elements in the sequence that belongs to state S. 
∑ First Time Seen (FTS): the timestamp of the first element in S. 
∑ Last Time Seen (LTS): the timestamp of the last element annexed to S [4]. 
Every transition δ from a source state (Src) to a destination state (Dst) is defined by 
a 6-tuple <Probability, Jumps, FJ, LJ, ATE, σATE> where: 
∑ Probability: the ratio of the number of jumps from Src to Dst to the total 
number of jumps from Src to any only state of the DTMC. 
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∑ #Jumps: The number of jumps from Src to Dst in the sequence. 
∑ First Jump (FJ): the timestamp of the first occurrence of this transition. 
∑ Last Jump (LJ): the timestamp of the last occurrence of this transition. 
∑ Average Time Elapsed (ATE): average time between two consequent 
states of Src and Dst. 
∑ Standard deviation on Time Elapsed (σATE): standard deviation 
calculated over all occurrence of this transition [4]. 
A model of correct ICS behavior is then built in the training phase by observing the 
network traffic of the ICS under normal operating conditions, and either identifying and 
adding new states and transitions, or updating the existing states and transitions. Once the 
model is trained it is used for anomaly detection, and is referred to as the baseline DTMC 
model. In order to detect anomalies, an additional model is trained on the ongoing network 
traffic which is referred to as the continuously-updating DTMC model. In the detection 
phase, the baseline DTMC model is dynamically compared to the continuously-learning 
DTMC model to identify anomalies. There are three possible types of anomalies [4]. 
1. Unknown State: A state has been created during the detection phase that 
did not exist in the training phase. This could be the effect of a semantic 
attack that attempted to change a setpoint to an incorrect value. 
2. Unknown Transition: A transition has been created during the detection 
phase that did not exist in the training phase. This could be the effect of an 
order-based sequence attack where valid commands are being sent to the 
actuators, but the sequence of the operations was altered to place the 
physical system in an unsafe condition. For example, draining a tank 
before a system is ready to receive the contents of that tank. 
3. Unknown Probability: The probabilities of transitions out of a state 
observed during the detection phase is significantly different than the 
probabilities seen during the training phase. This could be the effect of a 
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timing-based sequence-attack, where the repetition (or the lack) of 
occurrences of two events could cause damage to the physical system [4]. 
An occurrence of one of these anomalies indicates a possible attack and must be 
investigated further. There is a reasonable likelihood that false positives are generated and 
identifying them requires specific knowledge of the communication protocol and the ICS 
architecture and logic. 
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III. SEQUENCE-AWARE INTRUSION DETECTION FOR 
ETHERNET/IP AND CIP 
This chapter discusses the in-house industrial control system testbed, the ENIP and 
CIP communications implemented in the testbed, and the methods used to parse the ENIP 
and CIP messages to create a DTMC model of the testbed components. 
A. TESTBED DESCRIPTION 
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has an on-site testbed named Industrial 
Control System Instructional Cybersecurity Lab (ISCICL) that is designed to allow for 
security testing on an industrial control system similar to those found in the fleet. The 
ICSICL testbed was built in 2014 [14], with additional components being added in later 
years. The core functionality of the testbed consists of an Analog Fluid Tank Lab (AFTL) 
and a Digital Input/Output Lab (DIOL). The ATFL simulates a tank of fluid as well as the 
capability to fill and drain the tank. The DIOL consists of three proximity sensors that 
control the motion of a robotic arm. These components share a Programmable Logic 
Controller (PLC) and an engineering workstation used to program and supervise the PLC 
[17]. The engineering workstation also serves as the HMI system. 
The PLC runs a ladder logic program that accomplishes three objectives. First, it 
interfaces with the AFTL to continuously service the tank component sensors and update 
the local indicator lights. Second, it interfaces with the DIOL to continuously service the 
proximity sensors and provide serial input that actuates the robotic control arm. Third, it 
interfaces with the engineering workstation PC to continuously update the development 
software with the status of the ATFL and DIOL sensors. 
1. Analog Fluid Tank Lab (ATFL) 
The ATFL simulates an authentic cyber-physical system that controls equipment 
by monitoring analog Input/Output (I/O) signals. The AFTL local control station is shown 
in Figure 4. 
18 
 
Figure 4. ATFL local control station 
The ATFL system was originally designed with two modes, automatic and manual 
operation. In automatic operation the PLC automatically actuates the fill pump and drain 
valve to maintain a constant fluid level; however, for this thesis, this mode of operation is 
not used for any testing. Moving the HMI-override toggle switch to ON changes the ATFL 
to manual operation mode. In manual operation the PLC continuously monitors the 
actuators on the ATFL local control station and actuates the status lights on the local station 
accordingly. The PLC also reports the status of all ATFL components to the engineering 
workstation. The ATFL contains the following components: 
a. Tank-level Rheostat 
The tank-level rheostat is a variable resistor controlled by a manual dial. The 
manual operator can rotate this dial to adjust the simulated level of fluid in the tank. 
Rotating fully counterclockwise adjusts the tank level to empty and rotating full clockwise 
adjusts the tank level to full. 
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b. Tank-level Alarm Lights 
The simulated tank level is monitored by the PLC, and if the level is below the low-
level setpoint, the PLC will energize the Low Tank Level warning light. Similarly, if the 
tank level is above the high-level setpoint, the PLC will energize the High Tank Level 
warning light. The low level setpoint is at ~20% of max capacity, and the high level setpoint 
is at ~75% max capacity. 
c. Fill-pump Toggle Switch and Status Light 
The fill pump is controlled by a toggle switch on the front of the AFTL local control 
station. A pump-status indication light is located directly above the toggle switch. When in 
manual operation, placing the fill-pump switch to the ON position energizes the status light, 
but does not automatically change the simulated tank level. 
d. Drain-valve Toggle Switch and Status Light 
The drain valve is also controlled by a toggle switch on the front of the AFTL local 
control station. A valve-status indicator light is located directly above the toggle switch. 
When in manual operation, placing the drain valve to the OPEN position energizes the 
status light, but does not automatically change the simulated tank level. 
e. HMI-override Toggle Switch 
The HMI-override functionality is controlled by a toggle switch on the front of the 
AFTL local control station. Placing the HMI override toggle switch to the ON position 
enables manual operation of the other actuators on the AFTL local station while removing 
automatic control of the tank by the HMI system. 
The ATFL is connected to the analog input and output modules of the PLC, which, 
when in HMI- override mode, is programed to regularly send status updates to the HMI 
system every 0.5 seconds. The HMI system can display the status of the ATFL components 
as well as the state of the PLC’s internal ladder logic and related variables. 
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2. Digital Input/Output Lab (DIOL) 
The DIOL is intended to simulate an authentic cyber-physical system that controls 
equipment by monitoring digital I/O signals (Figure 5). The DIOL only operates in manual 
mode, where the PLC continuously monitors the status of the proximity sensors. When a 
proximity sensor is tripped, the PLC sends the corresponding command to the robotic 
control arm. Additionally, the PCL updates the HMI on the status of the proximity sensors 
every 0.5 seconds. The DIOL contains the following components: 
a. Proximity sensors 
There are three proximity sensors, labeled sensor 1, sensor 2, and sensor 3. Moving 
an object close to the top of any of these sensors causes them to trip, causing the digital I/O 
module to signal the PLC to take the programed action for the tripped sensor. Tripping 
sensor 1 causes the robotic control arm to move to the raised position. Tripping sensor 2 
causes the robotic control arm to move to the lowered position, and tripping sensor 3 causes 
the arm to move to the secured position as well as removing power to the arm. 
b. Robotic control arm 
The robotic control arm is a servo-driven commercial arm with three programed 
positions. It is connected to the PLC via a RS232 serial connection. After receiving a 
command from the PLC, the arm begins motion and then holds position when it reaches 
the correct position. However, the arm does not need to complete its motion before another 
command is received, and the most recent command will override any current action. 
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Figure 5. DIOL proximity sensors and control arm (in the secured position) 
3. Programable Logic Controller (PLC) 
The AFTL and DIOL are controlled by an Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation 
ControlLogix Programable Logic Controller with attached analog I/O, digital I/O and 
Ethernet (EWEB) modules (Figure 6). The PLC in turn is connected to the HMI via the 
EWEB module and communicates status updates to the HMI using the ENIP/CIP protocols. 
The PLC continuously monitors the status of ATFL and DIOL components, and issues 
output to the local status indicators of the AFTL or the control arm of the DIOL as soon as 
changes in input are noticed. When communicating with the HMI, the PLC waits until it 
receives an ENIP Send Unit Data command with an accompanying vendor-specific CIP 
service request (service code 0x4C) encapsulated within. The PLC responds with a 
message that contains the current status information of ATFL and DIOL components as 
the returned data item for the requested service. Since 0x4C is not a standard service code, 
the syntax and semantic of the response are not described in the CIP protocol specification 
[13]. The HMI sends this service request approximately every 0.5 seconds. Further details 
of ENIP/CIP implantation are discussed in Chapter III Section B. 
22 
 
Figure 6. ISCICL Allen-Bradly PLC with attached modules 
4. Human Machine Interface 
The HMI system consists of a Windows PC running Rockwell Automation Studio 
5000 software. It displays the execution status of the PLC ladder logic program and the 
internal variables representing the monitored components of the AFTL and DIOL. 
Approximately every 0.5 seconds it sends an ENIP/CIP status request to the PLC, which 
then responds with the information needed to update the HMI. 
B. DATA PREPARATION 
The PLC and HMI system are networked with an Ethernet connection and 
communicate over TCP/IP with ENIP/CIP as the application layer protocol. While Chapter 
II discussed the basics of the ENIP and CIP protocols, this section discusses how ENIP and 
CIP are used to monitor and control AFTL and DIOL components. It also describes how 
the ENIP and CIP messages are parsed to extract position data for these components. 
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1. HMI-PLC Communications Cycle 
The HMI and PLC follow a regular pattern of ENIP/CIP communications, with the 
HMI cycling through three different forms of the ENIP Send Unit Data command, and the 
PLC responding to each. Completion of this cycle takes approximately 0.5 seconds. All 
commands sent by the HMI and responses by the PLC consist of the ENIP encapsulation 
header associated with the Send Unit Data command, with two CPF items. The first CPF 
item is always a “Connected Address Item” with a length of 4 bytes. The second CPF item 
is always a “Connected Data Item,” but the contents and length of this item changes 
depending on the message being sent. Due to these similarities, messages are referred to 
by the CIP service request type and length found in the data portion of the ‘Connected Data 
Item’. 
The first message sent in the HMI-PLC communications cycle is a CIP “Get 
Attribute List” service request with a length of 12 bytes sent from the HMI (packet 1 in 
Figure 7). The PLC then responds with a 16-byte “Get Attribute List” service response 
(packet 2 in Figure 7). After the HMI receives the “Get Attribute List” response, it sends a 
CIP “Multiple Service Packet” Request containing 31 service requests (packet 3 in Figure 
7). The services for these service requests are either a vendor-define service code (0x4C) 
or the service code for the “Get Attribute List” command (0x03). The PLC replies with a 
“Multiple Service Packet” response containing data for each of the 31 service requests 
(packet 4 in Figure 7). Once the HMI receives this response, it sends another “Multiple 
Service Packet” containing nine service requests to the PLC using service codes of 0x4C 
and 0x03 (packet 5 in Figure 7). The PLC then replies with a “Multiple Service Packet” 
(packet 6 in Figure 7). Once the HMI receives this response, a communications cycle is 
complete, and the HMI begins another iteration of the cycle by sending another “Get 
Attribute List” service request. 
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Figure 7. Single iteration of the communications cycle 
The next step to being able to extract AFTL and DIOL data for use in a DTMC is 
to understand which packet within the communications cycle in which the data is 
contained. The implementation of CIP on the ICSICL system almost exclusively uses 
vendor-defined classes and service codes; therefore, the CIP specification cannot be used 
to look up the class and service definitions to understand what information the HMI is 
requesting during each part of the communications cycle. Therefore, the location of AFTL 
and DIOL component data was determined by observing packet contents while 
manipulating the two systems. It was discovered that both the ATFL and DIOL data was 
contained in the fourth packet in the cycle, which is the “Multiple Service Packet” response 
containing data for the 31 service requests. Herein, this is referred to as the packet of 
interest. 
2. ENIP Message Structure 
To extract the AFTL and DIOL data for use in an IDS, it is necessary to know the 
location of the data within the packet. Figure 8 shows the relevant components of IP, TCP, 
and ENIP portions of the packet of interest. 
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Figure 8. IP, TCP, and ENIP data in the packet of interest 
The IP header in the packet of interest (packet 4 in Figure 7) always has a source 
address of X.Y.Z.2 (the PLC) and a destination address of A.B.C.10 (the HMI). The TCP 
port for ENIP is 44818. The TCP payload contains the ENIP message that consists of an 
ENIP encapsulation header and the associated encapsulation data [12]. For the HMI-PLC 
communications cycle, the command field in the encapsulation header is always ‘Send Unit 
Data.’ The encapsulation data portion contains a CPF header and two CPF items. The CPF 
header consists of the CIP interface handle, a timeout value of 0x00, and an item count of 
two (0x0200). The first CPF item is a ‘Connected Address Item’ and the second CPF item 
is a “Connected Data Item.” The ‘Connected Address Item’ contains the CIP connection 
ID that identifies the message type, and the “Connected Data Item” contains the CIP service 
request that contains the data being transferred between the PLC and HMI. One feature 
that distinguishes the packet of interest from the other packets within the communications 
cycle is the value of 500 bytes in the length field of the “Connected Data Item” element. 
This observation is used by the parser to identify this packet from the others in the 
communications cycle, which it then extracts CIP data contained within the “Connected 
Data Item” element. 
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3. CIP Message structure 
Once the CIP portion of the target packet has been extracted, it must be parsed to 
locate the AFTL and DIOL data. Observing how this packet’s data changes when the AFTL 
and DIOL are manipulated shows that all the required data is located in the command data 
portion of the second service packet. Figure 9 shows the format of the CIP data and how 
to extract the command data portion for service packet #21. 
 
Figure 9. CIP Connected Data Item response for packet of interest 
The CIP sequence count is a two-byte value that is similar to the TCP ACK number, 
and changes with every CIP communication. Service Type is a one-byte value that is 
always 0x8A for the packet containing the AFTL and DIOL data. 0x8A is the code for a 
multiple-service-packet response, indicating that multiple CIP service codes are contained 
within this overall response to a multiple-service request. The next field is the two-byte 
status field. This field typically indicates that there is an embedded service error code 
0x1E00, which is caused by service packets 23–31 returning a partial transfer code. For 
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our analysis, this does not affect the ability of the PLC to communicate the status of the 
AFTL and DIOL and is ignored.  
The next section of CIP data is the multiple-service-packet response array. This is 
similar to the CPF in the ENIP encapsulation payload as they both allow for an extendable 
number of data items to share the same protocol header. To allow for ordering and parsing 
of an arbitrary number of CIP service requests, the first two fields of data within the 
multiple-service-packet response array are the number of services (2 bytes) and an offset 
list (two bytes for each service). The offset list contains an entry for each embedded service 
response; each entry contains a value specifying the number of bytes between the end of 
the status field and the beginning of a particular service response packet. For example, 
service response packet #21 is located by 1) finding the start of the offset list, 2) skipping 
the first forty bytes (the offset value for response packets #1–#20) and reading the next two 
bytes, which is the offset value for response packet #21, and 3) adding this offset value to 
the location value at the end of the status field. The resulting value is the starting location 
of service response packet #21.  
We observed that the AFTL and DIOL data is always located in data portion of the 
service response packet #21. The format of this response consists of three fields. The first 
field is the service response code, which in this case is always 0xCC indicating a response 
to the vendor-defined service 0x4C. Next, the two-byte status field is either 0x0000, 
indicating a successful response, or a non-zero value, indicated an error. During our test 
we always observed this field was set to 0x0000. The next twelve bytes are the data portion 
of the response, and contain the status of all AFTL and DIOL components. The data portion 
was determined to be twelve bytes by calculating the difference between the offset to 
response packet #21 and the offset to response packet #3. 
4. Service Response Data 
To build our DTMC model, it is necessary to understand how the 12-bytes data 
portion of service response packet #21 conveys the status of the AFTL and DIOL 
components. Figure 10 shows how these bytes are used for the AFTL and DIOL data. 
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Figure 10. Data portion of service response packet #2 
Only two of the twelve bytes are used to report the current state of the AFTL and 
DIOL components. Byte 1 contains a bitwise representation of the AFTL status, and byte 
10 contains a bitwise representation of the DIOL status. All other bytes are unused and 
have a value of 0x00. Figures 11 and 12 show the bitwise specification of the AFTL and 
DIOL respectively. 
 
Figure 11. Bitwise specification of AFTL data byte 
The AFTL data byte contains a bitwise representation of the five components of 
the AFTL. Bits 1, 7 and 8 are unused and left a value of zero. Bit 2 represents the status of 
the HMI-override switch, with a value of 1 representing HMI Override ON, and 0 
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representing HMI Override OFF. Bit 3 contains the fill-pump status, with pump ON being 
a value of 1, and pump OFF being a value of 0. Bit 4 contains the drain-valve status, with 
valve OPEN being a value of 1, and valve SHUT being a value of 0. Bits 5 and 6 are the 
low-level alarm status and high-level alarm status, with a value of 1 indicating the alarm is 
ON, and 0 indicated the alarm is OFF. For example, some hexadecimal values frequently 
seen while operating the AFTL for this byte are: 
∑ 0x58: HMI Override ON, Pump OFF, Valve OPEN, Low Level Alarm IN 
∑ 0x48: HMI Override ON, Pump OFF, Valve SHUT, Low Level Alarm IN 
∑ 0x68: HMI Override ON, Pump ON, Valve SHUT, Low Level Alarm IN 
∑ 0x60: HMI Override ON, Pump ON, Valve SHUT, no level alarms 
∑ 0x64: HMI Override ON, Pump ON, Valve SHUT, High Level Alarm IN 
∑ 0x44: HMI Override ON, Pump OFF, Valve SHUT, High Level Alarm IN 
∑ 0x54: HMI Override ON, Pump OFF, Valve OPEN, High Level Alarm IN 
∑ 0x50: HMI Override ON, Pump OFF, Valve OPEN, no level alarms 
 
Figure 12. Bitwise specification of DIOL data byte 
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The DIOL data byte also contains a bitwise representation of the three proximity 
sensors. Only bits 6, 7, 8 are used, with the rest always being a value of zero. Bit 8 contains 
the status of sensor #1 (raise arm); when the sensor is tripped the bit 8 is set to 1, otherwise 
it is 0. Bit 7 represents sensor #2 (lower arm), with a value of 1 if the sensor is tripped and 
0 if the sensor is not. Bit 6 represents sensor #3 (secure arm), with a value of 1 if the sensor 
is tripped and 0 if the sensor is not. For example, some hexadecimal values frequently seen 
during operation of the DIOL for this byte are: 
∑ 0x02: move arm to lowered position 
∑ 0x01: move arm to raised position 
∑ 0x04: move arm to secured position 
C. SEQUENCE-AWARE ATTACK DETECTION OF ENIP AND CIP 
The data that represents AFTL and DIOL component status is used as input to a 
DTMC to model the sequence of operations. As shown in [4], a DTMC can be constructed 
to model the states of an industrial process and the transitions between them. However, due 
to how network communications are implemented in ISCICL, the method of defining a 
states and transitions within the DTMC differs from that used in [4]. 
1. Model Generator 
For this thesis, a state S is defined as a 4-tuple <Data, #Elements, FTS, LTS> where: 
∑ Data: 12 bytes of command data, represented in hexadecimal form. 
∑ #Elements: the number of elements in the sequence that belongs to state S. 
∑ First Time Seen (FTS): the timestamp of the first element in S. 
∑ Last Time Seen (LTS): the timestamp of the last element annexed to S. 
The “Type” field used in [4] was removed due to the fact that all relevant ATFL 
and DIOL data are communicated via a Send Unit Data response from the PLC to the HMI, 
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causing this field to never change and therefore cannot be used to distinguish between 
different physical state of the AFTL and DIOL. 
A transition δ from a source state (Src) to a destination state (Dst) is defined by a 
4-tuple <Probability, Jumps, FJ, LJ> where: 
∑ Probability: the ratio of the number of jumps from Src to Dst to the total 
number of jumps from Src to any other state of the DTMC. 
∑ #Jumps: The number of jumps from Src to Dst in the sequence. 
∑ First Jump (FJ): the timestamp of the first occurrence of this transition. 
∑ Last Jump (LJ): the timestamp of the last occurrence of this transition. 
The “Average Time Elapsed” and “Standard Deviation on Time Elapsed” fields 
used in [4] were also removed. These fields are useful in an ICS that generates a network 
message when a remote command is issued or a component is changed by modeling the 
amount of time between relevant events. However, the AFTL and DIOL network traffic 
consists of a Send Unit Data request from the HMI and subsequent reply from the PLC at 
regular intervals, resulting in a constant amount of time between observation of new states 
and subsequently the transitions between those states.  
An additional deviation from the methods presented in [4] is the process to select 
what application layer data is used as input for the DTMC. For protocols and network 
implementations where each packet represents a new command or status update, the data 
portion of every observed packet should be used. However, the ICSICL communications 
cycle is based on the HMI sending the same data request at regular intervals and the PCL 
responding with data that represents the current system state. Since the data requests from 
the HMI consist of the same application layer command (CIP Send Unit Data), including 
them in the DTMC model will prevent the DTMC from modeling state transitions between 
physical states of the ICSICL components. If the method of using all application level 
communications as input to the DTMC, as presented in [4], is used on ICSICL, the states 
associated with the status of AFTL and DIOL components will always transition to a state 
that represents the HMI asking for a status update. To correct for this problem, the only 
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input to the DTMC model is the PLC data response (packet #4 in Figure 7). With the 
revised method every DTMC state represents the current configuration of ICSICL 
components and shows the transitions between component configurations. 
2. Transition Matrix 
A Python program was developed to parse captured ICSICL traffic and extract the 
relevant command data. That command data is used as input to our DTMC generator (also 
a Python program) with the behaviors detailed in Section C.1. As a result, a DTMC that 
models the status of AFTL and DIOL components is created. Table 6 shows the state 
transition matrix of our DTMC, Table 7 provides the definitions of the different states in 
our DTMC, and Figure 13 shows the state transition diagram. 








Figure 13. State transition diagram of the DTMC 
One interesting property of the state transition matrix is that each state has a high 
probability of transitioning to itself. This is a result of how status updates are sent in 
ICSICL, i.e., every 0.5 seconds. If component configuration has not changed between two 
iterations of the communications cycle, the data sent in the PLC’s response will be the 
same as the previous communication cycle. This results in a majority of the transitions 
from any one state in the DTMC being a transition back to the same state as shown in 
Figure 13. Additionally, this also gives a statistical representation of how frequently the 
components change state. This property is used to identify anomalies in the frequency of 
ICSICL component manipulations and discussed further in Chapter IV. 
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IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter describes the process used by our prototype DTMC-based IDS to 
detect sequence-based attacks as well as the series of tests performed to measure 
performance of the prototype. ICSICL network traffic is captured using Wireshark, and the 
processes outlined in Chapter III are used to create a DTMC model of the ICSICL 
component’s operation over time. This modeling process is performed twice; first on a 
traffic capture from known correct operation of the components to create a training model, 
and second on a traffic capture from the operations that are being monitored for intrusion 
to create an observation model. The observation model is then compared to the training 
model for any anomalies. 
A. METHODS FOR ANOMALY DETECTION 
As shown in [4], there are three types of anomalies a DTMC-based IDS can detect 
as a response to deviation from the normal sequence of operation in an industrial plant. 
First, state-based anomalies occur when the states of the observation model do not match 
the states of the training model. Second, transition-based anomalies occur when the 
transitions of the observation model do not match the transitions of the training model. 
Third, probability-based anomalies occur when the probability of the transitions of the 
observation model are not within the tolerance factor Σ of those in the training model. The 
exact method of comparing the training and observation model is different for each 
anomaly. Our prototype implements these three detection methods and four additional 
proposed methods that are expected to improve anomaly detection performance for attacks 
that occur over a small period of time. 
1. Invalid State Anomaly Detection 
An invalid state anomaly exists if the observation model contains one or more states 
that are not found in the training model. This would occur as the result of an attack that 
placed the state of the physical ISCICL components in a configuration that is not present 
in the training model. This type of anomaly is detected by iterating through each state in 
the observation model and checking if that state is also present in the training model. If it 
36 
is not, our detection algorithm considers it as an invalid state anomaly. Figure 14 shows a 
comparison between a training and observation model that results in an invalid state 
anomaly. 
 
Figure 14. Model comparison resulting in an invalid state anomaly 
2. Invalid Transition Anomaly Detection 
An invalid transition anomaly exists if the observation model contains one or more 
transitions of a particular state that are not found in the training model. This would occur 
as the result of an attack that manipulated the physical ICSICL components between two 
valid configurations, but the transition from the first to the second configuration was not 
present in the training model. This type of anomaly is detected by iterating through each 
transition of each state in the observation model and checking if that transition is also 
present in the training model. If it is not, our algorithm treats it as an invalid transition 
anomaly. Figure 15 shows a comparison between a training and observation model that 
results in an invalid transition anomaly. 
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Figure 15. Model comparison resulting in an invalid transition anomaly 
3. Invalid Probability Anomaly Detection: Batch Processing 
An invalid probability anomaly exits if there are one or more transition probabilities 
in the observation model that differ than the corresponding transition probabilities in the 
training model by more than the probability tolerance factor Σ. This is the most difficult 
type of attack to detect because both the start and end states as well as the transition 
between them are found in the training model. This means the attack will not place the 
system in a new condition (resulting in a new state in the model) or incorrectly transition 
the system between known conditions (resulting in a new transition in the model). Instead, 
this attack results in a significant change in the probabilities of what transition is chosen 
when exiting a given state. An example of an attack that could do this is one that repeatably 
cycles a component instead of allowing the underlying process to move on. If a limited 
amount of component cycling is allowed, this attack would not result in the creation of new 
states or transitions in the generated model. Instead, it would alter the probabilities of the 
transitions leaving the states that represent each position of the component that is being 
cycled. The probability of these states transitioning to each other would increase, and the 
probability of a transition to the rest of the known states would decrease. Additionally, 
because ISCICL status updates occur at a constant interval, an attack that significantly 
altered the amount of time between component manipulations would also result in an 
invalid probability anomaly. Figure 16 shows a comparison between a training and 
observation model that results in an invalid probability anomaly. 
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Figure 16. Model comparison resulting in an invalid probability anomaly 
The naïve method of detecting invalid probability anomalies is called batch 
processing. Batch processing involves creating a single training model using every packet 
in the training capture, and then comparing the difference between each transition 
probability in the training and observation models to ensure it is less than Σ. If the absolute 
value of the difference is found to be greater than Σ, an invalid transition probability 
anomaly is found. The method used for setting the initial value of Σ is discussed in Chapter 
IV Section D. Figure 17 shows a block diagram of the batch processing method. 
 
Figure 17. Batch processing method for transition probability anomaly 
detection 
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For all five probability anomaly detection methods supported by our prototype, the 
training model is created by reading the entire training traffic capture into a DTMC model, 
as shown in Figure 17. 
4. Localized transition probability deviations 
The batch method of transition probability detection is suitable if the attack occurs 
throughout the course of the captured traffic. However, if the attack only occurs over a 
relatively small timeframe its effects on the final transition probabilities can be very small 
and cause the attack to go undetected. Figure 47 in Chapter V Section 3 shows how batch 
processing can fail to detect attacks in this manner. To address this issue, our prototype 
also implemented four additional methods of transition probability anomaly detection. 
a. Stream Processing 
Stream processing limits the number of packets added to the observation model at 
a single time. A counter is maintained as each packet is processed into the DTMC 
observation model, and once the interval size X has been reached the observation model is 
compared with the training model for any anomalies. After this comparison, the counter is 
reset and the processing of data from the observation captures resumes. This process 
repeats until all packets have been processed into the observation model. With this method, 
the observation model is check for anomalies every X (interval size) packets, as opposed 
to only checking for anomalies once every packet has been processed. If an anomaly is 
detected at any of the comparisons the overall process is considered to have detected an 
anomaly.  
It is predicted that this method allows for higher likelihood of detecting localized 
anomalies at the beginning of the packet capture. However, as the total size of the 
observation DTMC grows, it is expected that performance will converge to be the same as 
the batch processing method. Additionally, the interval size must be carefully chosen, as 
an interval size that is too large will reduce the capability of localized anomaly detection, 
and an interval size that is too small can result in false positives due to the full set of 
possible transitions not being processed into the DTMC. Chapter IV Section D discusses 
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how an initial value for interval size is determined. Figure 18 shows a block diagram of the 
stream processing method. 
 
Figure 18. Stream processing method for transition probability anomaly 
detection 
b. Repeat Processing 
Repeat processing creates interim observation models as each packet from the 
observation traffic capture is processed. Similar to stream processing, this method uses a 
counter to limit the number of packets added to a particular observation model, and once 
the counter has reached the interval size, the observation model is compared to the training 
model for anomalies. Unlike stream processing, after the comparison and the interval size 
counter is reset, the current observation model is discarded and a new generation of 
observation model is created. This process repeats until there are no unprocessed packets 
in the observation traffic capture, and the final generation of observation model is 
compared with the training model.  
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This method is expected to be able to detect localized anomalies that occur 
throughout the observation capture and should not suffer the fall-off in performance that is 
expected from the stream processing method. However, because the number of packets 
used to the create the final observation model is not constant, it is possible that the full 
range of possible state, transitions, and transition probabilities are not represented in that 
model. This will possibly cause false positives in the final comparison and decrease the 
overall performance of the model. Additionally, it is expected that transition probability 
anomalies that occur in related packets that are separated by the interval size are less likely 
to be detected. The likely cause of this is the distribution of the packets containing the 
evidence of the anomaly being distributed across two observation models, decreasing the 
magnitude of the change of the transition probability of concern. Figure 19 shows a block 
diagram of the repeat processing method. 
 
Figure 19. Repeat processing method for transition probability anomaly 
detection 
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c. Sliding Window Processing 
Sliding window processing is a modification to repeat processing that includes 
overlap between the packets used to create consecutive generations of observation models. 
Once the first X (interval size) packets have been processed into a DTMC observation 
model and compared with the training model, the old observation model is discarded, and 
a new generation of model is created. However, instead of starting model development at 
the next unprocessed packet, the overlap size (Y) is used to select the last Y packets 
processed in the previous model and include them in development of the current 
generation’s model. For example, if interval size is 100 and overlap size is 50, the first 
observation model will be generated from packets 1 – 100, and the second observation 
model will be generated from packets 51–150. The third observation model will then be 
generated from packets 101–200. This process repeats until there are no unprocessed 
packets in the observation traffic capture, and the final observation model is compared with 
the training model. The overall result is that many separate observation models are 
generated from the observation capture, with each subsequent model re-using Y (overlap 
size) number of packets from the previous model. The expected performance of this 
method is similar to the expected performance of the repeat processing method, with the 
potential performance improvement of being more likely to detect probability anomalies 
that occur over the transition from one interval size to another. Using a sliding window to 
overlap what observation packets are used to generate subsequent observation models 
decreases the likelihood that the effect of an anomaly is separated between two observation 
models. However, the issue of an unreliable final model is still present. Chapter IV Section 
D discusses how an initial value for overlap size is determined. Figure 20 shows a block 
diagram of the sliding window processing method. 
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Figure 20. Sliding window processing method for transition probability 
anomaly detection 
d. Alpha Filter Processing 
The Alpha filter method is similar to repeat processing except that once an 
observation DTMC is used in a comparison function it is not totally discarded. Instead, it 
is used as input to an alpha filter to modify the next generation’s observation model’s 
transition table before comparing to the training model. This method is also known as 
exponential smoothing. The alpha filter processing method consists of the following 
calculation: 
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓[𝑇𝑇] = 𝛼𝛼 × 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓[𝑇𝑇 − 1]  + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) × 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟[𝑇𝑇] (1) 
Where: 
∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 is a transition matrix of the DTMC model that has been 
passed through the alpha filter. 
∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is a transition matrix of the DTMC model that has not been 
passed through the alpha filter. 
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∑ α is the filter constant. Must be withing range [0:1]. 
∑ t is the number of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 that have been generated. 
The result is that the transition probability values found in a given filtered model 
are a weighted average of the current model’s unfiltered probability values and the previous 
model’s probability values. The filter constant α determines the weight given to the 
previous model’s probability values. If α is set at 0.5, both the current raw model and 
previous filtered model have an equal effect on the current filtered model’s transition 
probability values. As α approaches zero, the previous filtered model has less effect on the 
current filtered model, and as α approaches one, the previous filtered model has more effect 
on the current filtered output. This method is expected to retain the localized anomaly 
detection benefits of the repeat processing and sliding window processing methods while 
reducing the number of false positives generated by the final observation model seen in 
those processing methods. Figure 21 shows a block diagram of the alpha filter processing 
method. 
 
Figure 21. Alpha filter processing method for transition probability anomaly 
detection 
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B. BASELINE OPERATING PROCEDURE 
In order to observe the performance of anomaly detection techniques, a baseline of 
normal operations on the industrial system being observed must be defined. This section 
defines the normal operating procedure of the ICSICL components used to create the 
training DTMC model. This operating procedure simulates a continuous process found in 
many industrial applications. The requirements used to design the Normal Operating 
Procedure (NOP) are as follows: 
1. It must be cyclic, with the initial condition of the components the same as 
the final condition. This will allow the procedure to be repeated an 
arbitrary number of times. 
2. It must be possible to generate an invalid state anomaly. Therefore, the full 
state space of possible component positions cannot be used, as there must 
be a component configuration not seen by the training model. 
3. It must be possible to generate an invalid transition anomaly. Therefore, 
there needs to be a pair of component positions that are one manipulation 
different from each other, but the normal operating procedure cannot 
contain a direct transition between those positions. 
4. It must be possible to generate an invalid transition probability anomaly. 
Therefore, the normal operating procedure must allow for some amount of 
cycling between two component positions, but excessive cycling should be 
defined as a violation of the procedure. 
For our experiments, an operator manually manipulates the components at the 
AFTL and DIOL according to the procedure to simulate an automated industrial process. 
While writing a separate ladder logic program for the PLC and HMI system to 
automatically perform the same process is possible, doing so would require a much more 
precise understanding of the vendor-defined CIP services and classes used in the ICSICL 
network, which is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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1. Initial Condition 
Prior to starting the normal operating procedure and the training traffic capture, the 
AFTL and DIOL components of the system must be placed in the correct initial conditions 
as shown in Table 8. The normal operating procedure described in Section B.2 returns all 
AFTL and DIOL components to the initial conditions, allowing another iteration of the 
normal operating procedure to be performed immediately after finishing the previous 
iteration. 
Table 8. Initial conditions for ATFL and DIOL components 
Component Initial Condition 
Tank low-level light LIT 
Tank-level control knob Rotate fully counterclockwise 
Drain valve OPEN 
Pump control OFF 
Control arm SECURED 
HMI override ON 
 
Although having the HMI-override switch set to ON is not typical for most 
industrial applications, it is required by ICSICL to allow the AFTL local control station to 
manually manipulate the ATFL components. 
2. Normal Operating Procedure 
After the AFTL and DIOL components are placed in the initial conditions and the 
training traffic capture is started, the component manipulations shown in the normal 
operating procedure below can begin. 
1. Drain valve > SHUT 
2. Pump control > ON 
3. Tank level control knob -> rotate clockwise to 12-o’clock position (Tank 
low level light > OFF) 
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4. Tank level control knob -> rotate fully clockwise (Tank high level light -> 
ON) 
5. Pump control > OFF 
(a) Pump control > ON 
(b) Pump control > OFF 
Note: Steps 5a and 5b may be performed between zero and two times. If 5a 
is performed, 5b must be performed before continuing to step 6 
6. Control arm > LOWERED position (hold sensor 2 for five seconds) 
7. Control arm > RAISED (hold sensor 1 for 5 sec) 
8. Control arm > LOWERED (hold sensor 2 for 5 sec) 
(a) Control arm > RAISED (hold sensor 1 for 5 sec) 
(b) Control arm > LOWERED (hold sensor 2 for 5 sec) 
Note: 8a and 8b may be performed between zero and two times. If 8a is 
performed, 8b must be performed before continuing to step 9 
9. Control arm > SECURED position (hold sensor 3 for 5 sec) 
10. Drain valve > OPEN 
11. Tank level control knob > rotate counterclockwise to 12-o’clock position 
(Tank high level light > OFF)  
12. Tank level control knob > rotate fully counterclockwise (Tank low level 
light > ON) 
Additionally, the operator must wait five seconds in between performing each step. 
This is to standardize the number of packets generated for each configuration of ICSICL 
components. This requirement extends to the operation of the proximity sensors in steps 6 
– 9 because the DIOL status updates described in Chapter 3 only occur if the sensor is 
pressed. Therefore, pressing for five seconds when activating the sensors will ensure 
updates from the PLC to the HMI include consistent sensor statuses.  
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At steps 5 and 8, a limited amount of component cycling is allowed. Steps 5a/5b 
and 8a/8b can only be performed up to two times; any further cycling of those components 
is defined as out of specification. The two-cycles limit was chosen to meet requirement #4 
while keeping the number of allowed cycles low to facilitate ease of testing. 
3. Generation of Training Models 
Using the NOP, four sets of traffic captures are generated to create four training 
models. These four captures differ in the amount of component cycling (steps 5a/5b and 
8a/8b) they include, but all remain within the specification defined in the NOP. These 
traffic captures are referred to as NOP1–NOP4 captures, and their models referred to as 
NOP1 – NOP4 training models, respectively. Table 9 defines NOP1-NOP4. 




iterations of NOP 
Special instructions 
NOP1 5 Do not perform steps 5a/5b or 8a/8b 
NOP2 5 Repeat steps 5a/5b twice 
NOP3 5 Repeat steps 8a/8b twice 
NOP4 5 Repeat steps 5a/5b and 8a/8b twice 
 
While each of the NOP captures is used to calculate an initial value for the 
probability tolerance factor Σ (described in Section 4.3), only NOP4 is used to create 
training models used for attack detection because it is the only one that includes the cycling 
of both components described in steps 5a/5b and 8a/8b. Hence, the NOP4 model is the only 
model to contain transitions and probability adjustments that represent these cycles. Using 
a NOP model that does not include the allowable amount of cycling of these two 
components as a training model would cause 1) false positive transition anomalies if 
compared to a model made from a capture that contains the allowable amount of cycling 
of the fill pump (steps 5a/5b), or 2) false positive probability anomalies if compared to a 
model made from a capture that contains the allowable amount of cycling of the robotic 
arm (steps 8a/8b) . For example, when NOP1 is used as the training model, comparing it 
to an observation model generated by NOP2 or NOP4 will result in an invalid transition 
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anomaly. Figures 22 and 23 show the state diagram and transition matrix for each of the 
NOP models. The orange highlighted transition shows the effect of performing steps 5a/5b 
in NOP2 and NOP4, and the green highlighted transition probabilities shows the effect of 
performing steps 8a/8b in NOP3 and NOP4. 
 
Figure 22. State transition diagrams for NOP1-NOP4 
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Figure 23. Transition matrices for NOP1-NOP4 
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The difference between NOP1 and NOP2 (in Figures 22 and 23) shows the effect 
of steps 5a/5b. Step 5a starts with the components in the condition represented by state 5 
(fill pump is OFF), and then turns the fill pump to ON, resulting in the model creating a 
transition from state 5 to state 4 in NOP2. This transition is not present in the NOP1 model 
and is highlighted in orange in Figures 22 and 23 (including when it occurs for NOP4). 
Increasing the number of transitions from state 5 to state 4 will also slightly affect the 
transition probabilities for all transitions leaving state 5 in NOP 2. All the transitions that 
are indirectly affected in this way are highlighted blue in Figures 22 and 23, including those 
in NOP3 and NOP4. Once step 5a is complete the system is left idle for 5 seconds, causing 
a transition from state 4 back to state 4, and when step 5b is performed (turning the pump 
back to OFF), a transition from state 4 to state 5 is generated. Since both of these transitions 
are already seen in NOP1, no new transitions are created, and since the ratio of 5 seconds 
of transitions from state 4 to state 4 followed by a single transition to state 5 is maintained 
in both the NOP1 and NOP2 captures, no effect on the transition probabilities leaving state 
4 is predicted. 
C. SIMULATED ATTACKS 
In addition to defining the NOP and generating the training models, the sequence-
based attacks must be simulated against ISCICL and their network traffic must be captured 
to generate observation models. Since ISCICL network communications does not include 
any commands to reposition components, sequence-based attacks must be simulated by a 
manual operator performing component manipulations that violate the normal operating 
procedure. These simulated attacks are organized by the anomaly type they intend to 
generate. 
1. Invalid State Attacks 
The objective of these attacks is to place the ICSICL system in a component 
configuration that does not exist in the NOP, and therefore test the ability to detect invalid 
state anomalies. There are two invalid state attacks, named IS1 and IS2. The corresponding 
traffic captures are referred to as IS1 and IS2 captures, and their models are referred to as 
IS1 and IS2 observation models, respectively. Table 10 defines the IS1 and IS2 attacks. 
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During each iteration after step 4 is completed, 
place the HMI-override switch to OFF for five 
seconds, then return to ON before proceeding to 





during each iteration after step 2 is completed, 
hold proximity sensor 2 for five seconds, then 
hold proximity sensor 3 for five seconds 
 
Each IS attack will only consist of three iterations of the NOP. This was chosen to 
achieve a balance between having enough iterations to create consistency in the resulting 
model and limiting the number of total iterations for ease of manually operating the 
physical components when the attacks are conducted.  
The IS1 attack will generate a new state in the IS1 observation model because the 
HMI-override switch is never moved to the OFF position during the NOP. This action will 
cause a unique value in the CIP command data section to be sent from the PLC to the HMI 
system during the communications cycle. Figures 24 and 25 illustrate the invalid state 
anomaly by showing the expected transition matrix and state diagram for the IS1 
observation model alongside those of the NOP4 model. IS1 is expected to generate a new 
state, called state 11, when the HMI switch is repositioned. The effect of this new state on 
the transition matrix and state diagram is highlighted in red in Figures 24 and 25. 
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Figure 24. Expected transition matrix for IS1 attack 
 
Figure 25. Expected state diagram for IS1 attack 
The IS2 attack will generate two new states in the IS2 observation model (state 11 
and state 12) because the proximity sensors are only activated when the AFTL pump is 
OFF, valve is SHUT, and high-level alarm is LIT. Since the DIOL status is communicated 
in the same twelve bytes as the AFTL status, manipulating the DIOL when the AFTL is in 
any other condition will result in a unique value in the command data section. State 11 
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represents the activation of proximity sensor #2 while the fill pump is ON, drain valve is 
SHUT and low-level alarm is LIT (represented as state #2). State 12 represents the 
activation of proximity sensor #3 in these conditions. Figures 26 and 27 show the transition 
matrix and state diagram of the expected model of the IS2 attack together with the transition 
matrix and state diagram of the NOP4 model. States 11 and 12 are highlighted to show the 
expected invalid state anomalies. 
 
Figure 26. Expected transition matrix for IS2 attack 
 
Figure 27. Expected state transition diagram for IS2 attack 
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2. Invalid Transition Attacks 
There are two invalid transition attacks, named IT1 and IT2. These attacks are 
intended to create a new transition between two valid states of the NOP4 training model, 
testing the ability to detect invalid transition anomalies. The corresponding traffic captures 
are referred to as IT1 and IT2 captures, and their models are referred to as IT1 and 2 
observation models, respectively. As with the IS attacks, each IT attack will only consist 
of three iterations of the NOP. The reasoning behind conducting three iteration is the same 
as presented for the IS attacks. Table 11 defines the IT1 and IT2 attacks. 
Table 11. Definition of invalid transition traffic captures 
Capture/Test 
Name 







During each iteration step 3 is skipped, and 
the tank level control knob is quickly 
turned to the fully clockwise position. 
IT2 3 During each iteration steps 1 and 2 are 
performed at the same time. 
 
The IT1 attack will generate a new transition between states 2 and 4 of the NOP4 
model (see Figure 7) by skipping the state where neither of the tank-level alarms is lit (state 
3), causing the IT1 observation model to contain the transition from the AFTL component 
status with the low-level alarm LIT directly to the AFTL component status with the high-
level alarm LIT, which is not in the training model. Figures 28 and 29 show the transition 
matrix and state diagram of the expected model of the IT1 attack along with the transition 
matrix and state diagram of NOP4 model. The new transition from state 2 to state 4 is 
highlighted in red and is expected to cause a transition anomaly. Additionally, since state 
3 is entirely skipped, the expected model does not contain any transitions to or from state 
3. The transitions that are affected by skipping state 3 are highlighted in orange, with the 
new transition from state 2 to state 4 highlighted in red. 
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Figure 28. Expected transition matrix for IT1 attack 
 
Figure 29. Expected state diagram for IT1 attack 
The IT2 attack will generate a new transition between states 0 and 2 of the NOP4 
model (see Table 7) by skipping the state where the drain valve is SHUT but the fill pump 
is OFF (state 1), causing the IT2 observation model to transition from state 0 directly to 
state 2. Figures 30 and 31 show the transition matrices and state diagrams of the expected 
model of the IT2 attack and the NOP4 model. The new transition from state 0 to state 2 is 
57 
highlighted in red and is expected to cause a transition anomaly. Additionally, since state 
1 is entirely skipped, the expected model does not contain any transitions to or from state 
1. The transitions that are affected by skipping state 1 are highlighted in orange, and the 
new transition from state 0 to state 2 highlighted in red. 
 
Figure 30. Expected transition matrix for IT2 attack 
 
Figure 31. Expected state diagram for IT2 attack 
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3. Invalid Transition Probability Attacks 
Each of these attacks is expected to create an observation model that contains 
transition probabilities that differ from those found in the NOP4 training model by more 
than Σ. The initial Σ is 0.015 as described in section C.1 of this chapter, and Σ will remain 
at that value for all subsequent tests. Additionally, localized transition anomalies at various 
points within the traffic capture are introduced to compare the performances of the 
proposed detection methods. These generated traffic captures are referred to as IP1 through 
IP9 captures, and their models are referred to IP1 through IP9 observation models, 
respectively. Table 12 defines the IP1-IP9 attacks. 
Table 12. Definition of invalid probability traffic captures 
Capture/Test 
Name 
Number of iterations 
of NOP 
Special instructions 
IP1 3 During each iteration steps 5a/5b are repeated 
three times 
IP2 3 During each iteration steps 5a/5b are repeated 
five times 
IP3 3 During each iteration steps 5a/5b are repeated 
ten times 
IP4 5 During the first iteration steps 5a/5b are 
repeated five times. All other iterations are 
completed as normal 
IP5 5 During the first iteration steps 5a/5b are 
repeated ten times. All other iterations are 
completed as normal 
IP6 5 During the third iteration steps 5a/5b are 
repeated five times. All other iterations are 
completed as normal 
IP7 5 During the third iteration steps 5a/5b are 
repeated ten times. All other iterations are 
completed as normal 
IP8 5 During the last iteration steps 5a/5b are 
repeated five times. All other iterations are 
completed as normal 
IP9 5 During the last iteration steps 5a/5b are 
repeated ten times. All other iterations are 
completed as normal 
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a. IP1 through IP3 
The IP1 through IP3 attacks consist of three iteration of the NOP for the same 
reasons as discussed for IS and IT attacks. The actions in captures IP1 through IP3 violate 
the NOP during each iteration by the cycling the fill pump above the number of times that 
the NOP allow. The amount of cycling is designed to simulate attacks that require different 
levels of difficult to detect: high (IP1), medium (IP2), and low (IP3). IP1 does this cycling 
only one extra time, and while it is expected that this action will trigger a probability 
anomaly, the transition probabilities in IP1 will have the smallest deviation from the 
corresponding transition probabilities in NOP4. IP2 and IP3 increase the number of cycling 
of the drain pump to five and ten respectively, therefore increasing the magnitude of the 
difference between their transition probabilities and those in NOP4. 
Figures 32 and 33 show the transition matrixes and state diagrams for the IP1–IP3 
attacks and the NOP4 model. Because each of these attacks increases the number of times 
state 5 transitions to state 4, the transition probability from state 5 to state 4 is expected to 
show the largest change. However, it is important to note that all of the transition 
probabilities from state 5 will be affected. It is expected that the invalid probability 
anomaly is triggered by the comparison of the IP attack’s probability value for the 
transition from state 5 to state 4 to NOP4’s probability value for the transition from state 5 
to state 4. However, for the IP3 attack, the amount that this transition’s probability is 
changed could also cause other transition’s probabilities from state 5 to differ from their 
corresponding probability in NOP4 by more than Σ, triggering multiple transition 
anomalies. The expected transition probabilities that will trigger the transition anomaly are 
highlighted in red.  
The attacks in IP1-IP3 are included in each iteration of the NOP, and the statistical 
effect of the attack on transition probabilities is approximately the same for each of the 
iterations within the capture. Therefore, all five probability anomaly detection methods are 
expected to correctly identify the probability anomaly, and since each iteration during the 
attack is the same, all probability anomaly detection methods are expected to have 
approximately the same transition matrix. Therefore, each IP transition matrix and state 
diagram displayed in Figures 32 and 33 represent the expected performance of each 
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anomaly detection method. The specific transition probabilities that are expected to cause 
probability anomalies are highlighted in red, while the probabilities that are expected to be 
affected, but not enough to cause an anomaly are highlighted in orange. 
 
Figure 32. Expected transition matrixes for IP1-IP3 attacks 
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Figure 33. Expected state diagram for IP1-IP3 attacks 
b. IP4 through IP9 attacks 
For the IP4 - IP9 attacks, only the actions in the iteration that cycles the fill pump 
above the number of times that the NOP allows violate the NOP. The number of iterations 
of the NOP used in these attacks is increased to five to provide more iterations that do not 
contain a violation of the NOP, therefore decreasing the statistical effect the single attack 
containing iteration has on the overall model. This makes localized anomaly detection more 
difficult and will give more insight to the differences between the probability anomaly 
detection methods. Specifically, batch processing is expected to fail to detect all of these 
attacks, while stream processing is expected to fail to detect attacks IP6 – IP9. Batch and 
stream processing methods are expected to have difficulty detecting localized anomalies, 
while repeat processing, sliding window, and alpha filter methods are expected to 
successfully detect them. The IP4 – IP9 attacks are designed to test this hypothesis.  
IP4 and IP5 place the localized anomaly in the first iteration of the capture. In IP6 
and IP7, the localized anomaly occurs in the 3rd iteration of the capture, and in IP8 and 
IP9 the localized namely occurs in the 5th and final iteration of the capture. These 
differences allow tests to determine if the performance (successful detection) of the 
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anomaly detection methods is dependent on where the localized anomaly is within the 
capture. Additionally, the localized anomaly in IP4, IP6, and IP8 consists of five cycles of 
performing steps 5a/5b while IP5, IP7, IP9 consists of ten cycles of steps 5a/5b. This 
provides two levels of magnitude of the localized anomaly and is included to determine if 
some anomaly detection methods can find large localized anomalies but not smaller ones. 
However, the expectation is that if an anomaly detection method is expected to detect a 
localized anomaly, the magnitude of that anomaly does not matter. Therefore, the expected 
transition matrixes and state diagrams shown in this section do not differentiate between 
larger and smaller versions of localized anomalies. 
(1) IP4 through IP9: Batch Processing 
Batch processing makes a single observation model from every packet in the 
observation capture, and then compares the observation model to the training model. Since 
the anomaly in IP4-IP9 only occurs during one of five iterations, the statistical effect on 
the transition probabilities will likely not be of large enough magnitude for the batch 
processing method to detect.  
Figures 34 and 35 show the transition matrix and state diagram of the IP4-IP9 
attacks when processed with the batch processing method. The transition probabilities from 
state 5 are highlighted green to show that while it did change from the probability found in 




Figure 34. Expected transition matrix for IP4-IP9 attacks with batch 
processing method 
 
Figure 35. Expected state diagram for IP4-IP9 attacks with batch processing 
method 
(2) IP4 through IP9: Stream Processing 
Stream processing checks for anomalies several times as a single observation model 
is getting built, and therefore can detect localized anomalies if they occur early in the 
observation capture. However, if the localized anomalies occur late in the observation 
64 
capture the statistical effect on the transition probabilities will likely not be of large enough 
magnitude for the stream processing method to detect. Therefore, stream processing is 
expected to detect the anomaly in IP4 and IP5, but not in IP6-IP9.  
Figures 36 and 37 show the transition matrix and state diagram for the IP4-IP5 
attacks and IP6-IP9 attacks when processed with the stream processing method. The 
expected successful detection of the transition anomaly early in the capture (IP5-IP5) is 
shown in red, indicating the transition probability that differs with the corresponding NOP4 
transition probability by more than Σ. The other transition probabilities leaving state 5 are 
highlighted in green to show that while they change, their expected change is less than Σ 
and should not cause an anomaly. The expected failure to detect the anomaly later in the 
capture (IP6-IP9) is shown in green, showing the transition probabilities that fail to differ 
from the corresponding NOP4 transition probabilities by more than Σ. Additionally, since 
stream processing involves comparing many different observation models, only the 
expected observation model that triggers the anomaly is shown. All other generations of 
the observation model would be redundant since once a single generation detects an 
anomaly the entire observation capture is considered to contain an anomaly. 
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Figure 37. Expected state diagrams for IP4-IP9 attacks with stream processing 
(3) IP4 through IP9: Repeat, Sliding Window, and Alpha Filter Processing 
Repeat processing, sliding window, and alpha filter detection methods limit the 
number of packets used in each observation model. Therefore, the observation model 
generated by the packets that contain the localized anomaly is not statistically diluted by 
iterations of the NOP that contain no anomalies. Hence, each of these detection methods is 
expected to detect the anomaly in IP4-IP9. 
Figures 38 and 39 show the transition matrix and state diagram for the IP4-IP9 
attacks when processed with the repeat processing, sliding window, and alpha filter 
methods. As each processing method is expected to successfully detect the localized 
anomaly, the expected values of the transition matrix and state diagram for each method 
have been condensed into a single matrix and diagram. The expected successful detection 
of the transition anomaly is shown in red, indicating the transition probability that differs 
with the corresponding NOP4 transition probability by more than Σ. The other transition 
probabilities leaving state 5 are highlighted in green to show that while they will change, 
they are not expected to differ from their corresponding probabilities in NOP4 by more 
than Σ and therefore should not cause anomalies. Additionally, since stream processing 
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involves comparing many different observation models, only the expected observation 
model that triggers the anomaly is shown. All other generations of the observation model 
would be redundant since once a single generation detects an anomaly the entire 
observation capture is considered to contain an anomaly. 
 
Figure 38. Expected transition matrixes for IP4 -IP9 attacks with repeat, 
sliding window, and alpha filter processing methods 
 
Figure 39. Expected state diagrams for IP4-IP9 attacks with repeat 
processing, sliding window, and alpha filter methods 
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While each of these three methods is expected to correctly detect the probability 
anomalies, the repeat processing and sliding window methods will likely generate false 
positives during the final generation of observation model creation and generation, i.e., the 
final observation model is not guaranteed to be generated from packets that represent a full 
cycle of the NOP; therefore, it may not contain every state or transition found in the training 
model. As discussed in Section A.4.d, the alpha filter method is expected to address this 
performance issue and should reduce the number of false positives. The expected transition 
matrixes and state diagrams showing the expected false positives for the repeat and sliding 
window methods are not included, as the exact nature of what states and transitions are 
affected is difficult to predict. 
4. Scalability of data 
An operational IDS must process large amounts of data and to measure the 
performance of the models as the data grow in size, we use two datasets. The small dataset 
contains relatively small file sizes, e.g., NOP1 contains 5,652 packets and only 599 packets 
contribute to the generated models. The large dataset contains packet captures made by 
concatenating existing captures to create test data sets of 10 times and 100 times the size 
of the original data. Both datasets are used in the same way for observation model 
generation and training model comparison. For the tests using the large dataset, the 
expected observation transition matrixes and expected results are the same as for the 







Table 13. Large data set captures 
Test 
Name 









IS1x10 Concatenate the IS1 
capture with itself 10 
times 
IS1 466,320 5,510 
IS1x100 Concatenate the IS1 
capture with itself 100 
times 
IS1 4,663,200 55,100 
IT1x10 Concatenate the IT1 
capture with itself 10 
times 
IT1 389,950 4,620 
IT1x100 Concatenate the IT1 
capture with itself 100 
times 
IT1 3,899,500 46,200 
IP2x10 Concatenate the IP2 
capture with itself 10 
times 
IP2 678,060 8,020 
IP2x100 Concatenate the IP2 
capture with itself 100 
times 
IP2 6,780,600 80,200 
IP4x10 Concatenate the IP4 
capture with itself 10 
times 
IP4 772,420 9,150 
IP4x100 Concatenate the IP4 
capture with itself 100 
times 
IP4 7,724,200 91,500 
IP6x10 Concatenate the IP6 
capture with itself 10 
times 
IP6 778,850 9,210 
IP6x100 Concatenate the IP6 
capture with itself 100 
times 
IP6 7,788,500 92,100 
IP8x10 Concatenate the IP8 
capture with itself 100 
times 
IP8 771,550 9,130 
IP8x100 Concatenate the IP8 
capture with itself 100 
times 
IP8 7,715,500 91,300 
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D. INITIAL VALUES FOR HYPER-PARAMETERS 
Among the five presented methods for detecting transition probability anomalies, 
four hyper-parameters are used to control the behavior of these methods. Initial values for 
these hyper-parameters must be set before performance of the anomaly detection methods 
can be observed. 
1. Probability Tolerance Factor 
A probability tolerance factor is used in every probability anomaly detection 
method. The probability of each transition in the observation model is compared to the 
probability of that transition in the training model, and if the observation model’s 
probability differs from the training model’s by more than Σ, a transition probability error 
has occurred. Therefore, finding a correct value for Σ is critical to a functioning IDS. The 
initial value of Σ is set by comparing two of the NOP models together, finding the 
maximum difference between corresponding transition probabilities, and setting Σ to a 
value just above that difference. Using the batch processing method with NOP1 as the 
training model, NOP4 as the observation model, and Σ = 0 results in a probability anomaly 
for every transition, but the largest difference in probabilities is 0.0127. Therefore, the 
initial value for Σ is set at 0.0150. To verify this value, the batch processing method was 
used with NOP1, NOP2, and NOP3 as the training models, each with NOP4 as the 
observation model, and no probability anomalies were triggered, indicating that this value 
does not result in false positives. 
Figure 40 shows the transition matrixes of NOP1 (without steps 5a/5b and 8a/8b) 
and NOP4 (with cycling of steps 5a/5b and 8a/8b), and highlights the probabilities affected 
by cycling components as well as the greatest difference between corresponding 
probabilities of the two models. Performing step 5a will cause a transition from state 5 back 
to state 4, and performing step 8a will cause a transition from state 5 to state 7. Performing 
step 8b will cause a transition from state 5 to state 6. Since these steps of the cycling both 
affect transitions leaving state 5, it is expected that the transition with the greatest 
probability difference between NOP1 and NOP4 will be one of the transition probabilities 
of leaving state 5, and these are highlighted in blue in Figure 40. Step 5b results in a 
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transition from state 4 to state 5, but since the sequence of transitioning from state 4 to state 
4 for five seconds, followed by a single transition from state 4 to state 5 is maintained 
between both NOP1 and NOP4, the probabilities of the transitions leaving state 4 in NOP 
4 are not expected to change in any significant way. 
 
Figure 40. comparison of NOP1 and NOP4 transition matrixes 
Further inspection of the transition matrixes shows an unexpected result. It was 
expected that the greatest difference between corresponding probabilities of the NOP1 and 
NOP4 models would be one of the probabilities affected by the component cycling during 
step 5a/5b or 8a/8b (highlighted in blue in Figure 40). However, the greatest difference of 
corresponding probabilities is from the transitions out of state 0. Table 14 is an excerpt 
from Table 7 that shows the shows the AFTL and DIOL component statuses that make up 
states 0 and 1. 
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Table 14. DTMC state definitions for states 9 and 10 
State 
Name 















0 0x580000000000000000000000 OFF OPEN LIT NOT 
LIT 
None 




The transition between states 0 and 1 is a result of step 1 in the NOP and should not 
have been significantly affected by the differences between NOP1 and NOP4 captures. 
While care was taken during the creation of all the traffic captures to spend 5 seconds 
between each component operation, this deviation is likely due to lack of consistency by 
the operator when performing step 1 of the NOP. However, this is useful in illustrating the 
sensitivity of these models to the timing of the steps of the NOP. Since the steps required 
to create each traffic capture were conducted using a watch to manually time the 5-second 
delay in between each step, the observed probability difference is considered within 
tolerance of the system requirements, and therefore the probability tolerance factor Σ 
remains set at 0.0150. 
2. Interval Size 
An interval size is used by several probability anomaly detection methods to limit 
the maximum number of packets used in the creation of an observation model. If the 
interval size is too large, localized anomalies may not be detected, resulting in false 
negatives during anomaly detection. If the interval size is too small, then the generated 
observation model might not be representative of the underlying industrial process and 
generate false positives during anomaly detection due to missing states or transitions. 
Therefore, an interval size should at least contain packets representing one full iteration of 
the industrial process. In order to find this value, the NOP4 capture was observed to see 
how many packets it took to complete one iteration of the NOP. The greatest number of 
packets between the start and end of a NOP iteration was 313. Hence, to have interval size 
be an even number for ease of interaction with the overlap size (discussed in Section D.3), 
an initial value of 320 for interval size is chosen. The NOP4 capture was used to determine 
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this hyper-parameter because it represents the maximum amount of component cycling 
allowed, and therefore each iteration requires the most packets to represent.  
For the repeat processing, sliding window, and alpha filter methods, two additional 
tests are conducted with a different interval size. As discussed in section 4.1.6, the repeat 
processing method of probability anomaly detection is expected to have poor performance 
if the modeling division made by the interval size bisects the packets that contain the 
information that creates the probability anomaly in the training model. It is also anticipated 
that the sliding window and alpha filter methods have consistent performance under these 
circumstances. Table 15 describes the two scenarios used to test this part of the hypothesis. 
Table 15. Interval size performance tests 





IP6_int1 IP6 206 Repeat method fails to detected 
probability anomaly. Sliding window 
and alpha filter successfully detect 
probability anomaly.  
IP8_int1 IP8 175 Repeat method fails to detected 
probability anomaly. Sliding window 
and alpha filter successfully detect 
probability anomaly. 
 
For each of these tests, the interval size is selected to result in a bisection of the 
portion of packets that contain the anomaly causing data. For IP6_int1, the packets that 
generate the anomaly are packet numbers 343 through 482; therefore, packet number 412 
perfectly bisects the anomaly-causing packets. An interval size 206 will cause the second 
and third models generated by the repeat processing, sliding window, and alpha filter 
methods to bisect this portion of anomaly-causing data. For IP8_int1, the packets that 
generate are packet numbers 597 through 804, therefor packet number 700 perfectly bisects 
the anomaly-causing packets. An interval size of 175 will cause the fourth and fifth models 
generated by the repeat processing, sliding window, and alpha filter methods to bisect this 
portion of the anomaly-causing data. While an interval size of 350 would also result in a 
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bisection of the anomaly- causing data, 175 is preferred because it is closer to the interval 
size used in IP6_int1; therefore, any effects of smaller than typical interval size will be 
seen in both of these tests, making their results easier to compare with each other. 
3. Window Size 
Window size is used by the sliding window detection method to determine how 
many packets a given observation model should re-use from the previous observation 
model. Our assumption is that a window size of one half of interval size will allow 
sufficient packets being included in the overlap between the two observation models to 
detect any localized anomalies occurring at the interval size division. Additionally, it is 
small enough to prevent each section of the observation capture from being used in multiple 
observation models and unnecessarily slowing the performance of the anomaly detection 
method as a whole. Therefore, an initial value for window size is 160. If the interval size 
is changed, the window size must also be changed to always be one half of interval size. 
4. Alpha Filter Constant 
The alpha filter constant represents what percentage of the previous observation 
model’s probability values are used in the current observation model. As discussed in 
section A.4.d, the alpha filter anomaly detection method is expected to show an increase in 
performance over the repeat processing and sliding window methods, specifically by not 
resulting in false positives from the comparison of the final observation model. However, 
if the alpha filter constant is set too low, the final filtered model will not incorporate enough 
of the previous filtered model’s data to prevent such a false positive. If the filter constant 
is set to high, the current raw model’s probability values will not have enough weight to 
affect the previous filtered model’s probability values when there is an anomaly, resulting 
in a false negative. An initial value of 0.2 was chosen for the alpha filter constant to give a 
larger weight to the current raw model’s probability values while still providing adjustment 
from the previous filtered model’s probability values. However, a range of alpha filter 
values are used during tests with the IP6 traffic capture to observe how performance 
changes as the alpha filter constant changes. Table 16 shows the tests and alpha filter 
constant values used for this experiment. 
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Table 16. Alpha filter constant performance tests 







IP6_alpha1 IP6 0.05 No performance difference from the repeat and 
sliding window results from test IP6 
IP6_alpha2 IP6 0.1 No performance difference from the repeat and 
sliding window results from test IP6 
IP6_alpha3 IP6 0.2 Successfully detects the probability anomaly, 
and does not include a false positive from the 
final raw model  
IP6_alpha4 IP6 0.5 Unable to detect any anomalies 
IP6_alpha5 IP6 0.7 Unable to detect any anomalies 
 
The IP6 capture is chosen because it contains a localized anomaly that the alpha 
filter method is designed to be able to detect, and the anomaly is included in the middle of 
the capture preventing the first filtered model from containing the anomaly. If the first 
filtered model contains the anomaly, a high alpha filter constant would not result in a false 
negative because each subsequent generation would consist of a large weighting of the first 
generation’s data. 
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V. RESULTS 
This chapter discusses the results for the tests described in Chapter IV. The initial 
results showed that further tuning of hyper-parameter values was needed. The hyper-
parameters of Σ and α were adjusted by optimizing the precision values for select tests, and 
the optimal values were used for each test described in Chapter IV. 
A. INITIAL RESULTS 
The tests presented in Chapter IV for the IS1, IS2, and IP4 attacks were conducted 
first and the results were analyzed to identify potential issues early in the testing process. 
Table 17 show the summary for these results. 
Table 17. Experiment summary for IS1, IS2 and IP4 tests 
 
 
These results matched the expected results relative to detecting the anomaly present 
in each of the captures. As expected, all four processing methods detected the invalid state 
anomaly in IS1 (test 1 through 4) and the invalid transition anomaly in IT1 (tests 5 through 
8). For test #9, the batch processing method was unable to detect the expected invalid 
probability anomaly, while tests 10 through 12 show that the stream, repeat, and sliding 
window methods were able to detect the anomaly.  
However, the number of anomalies not related to the attack, particularly from each 
test using the stream, repeat, and sliding window processing methods, was unexpected, and 
further investigation of these results was necessary. Of the tests shown in Table 17, tests 
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9–12 were of particular interest as they contain the highest rate of false positive anomalies. 
Table 18 shows the expected results for the IP4 tests for each processing methods. The 
batch processing method was not expected to detect the attack, as the attack only resulted 
in a localized anomaly. Since the localized anomaly is located early in the capture, the 
stream, repeat, sliding window, and alpha filter methods were expected to detect the 
probability anomaly in the first observation model they generated. The attack was expected 
to be detected by a probability anomaly on the transition from state 5 to state 4. The IP4 
attack involves cycling the fill pump more than the NOP specification allows, resulting in 
the observation model containing more transitions from state 5 to state 4 than training 
model. Therefore, the transition probability from state 5 to state 4 was expected to be the 
probability with the greatest change, and the source of the invalid probability anomaly. The 
expected results for the IP4 tests are compared to the observed results for test 12 shown in 
Table 19. 
In Tables 18 and 19, the value in the “final packet in model” column denotes the 
number of the final packet used in the creation of the observation model that observed the 
anomaly. This enables tracking of which portions of the observation capture that generated 
the anomaly when detecting localized anomalies. 
Table 18. Expected results for IP4 
 
PA = Probability Anomaly 
79 
Table 19. Observed results for test 12 (IP4 with sliding window processing) 
 
PA = Probability Anomaly 
PA* = Probability Anomaly that would not exists if Σ=0.024 
 
A comparison of the expected and observed results shows two things. First, the 
anomaly was successfully detected. While the observed results also show anomalous 
transitions from state 5 to states 6 and 7, this is not alarming. Since the sum of all 
probabilities leaving a state must be 1.0 [15], changing the probability of the state 5 to state 
4 transition is guaranteed to change all the other probabilities for transitions leaving state 
5. In this case, the probabilities of transitions from state 5 to states 6 and 7 were changed 
enough to be considered as anomalies. These are not considered false positives because 
they are a direct result of the true anomaly and would be considered a successful detection 
of the attack, and are highlighted in green in Table 19 to reflect that they are part of the 
successful attack detection.  
However, the second feature shown by analyzing the results is the high number of 
false positive anomalies. Eighteen of the detected anomalies are not the result of the attack, 
and while some number of false positive anomalies were expected for the final model 
generated by the repeat and sliding window methods, these false positive anomalies are 
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from observation models made from all points within the observation capture. 
Additionally, this is not isolated to just test 12, and false positive probability anomalies are 
a common feature for every test using the streaming, repeat, and sliding window processing 
methods.  
Therefore, the conclusion drawn from these preliminary tests is that while anomaly 
detection is performing as expected, the number of false positive anomalies must be 
addressed before a comprehensive review of the results is conducted. The expected cause 
of the observed high number of false positive anomalies is the value of the probability 
tolerance factor (Σ). Analysis of Table 19 shows that the false positive anomalies marked 
with an asterisk could be eliminated by increasing Σ to 0.027 while retaining the ability to 
detect the attack. 
B. HYPER-PARAMETER ADJUSTMENT 
This section describes the performance metrics and tests used to adjust the hyper-
parameter values of Σ, as well as the results of the IP6_alpha series of tests that determine 
an optimal value for the alpha filter constant. 
1. Probability Tolerance Factor (Σ) Tuning 
As described in Chapter III, Σ was set by comparing the batch models generated 
using the NOP series of captures. By definition, the NOP series of captures do not contain 
anomalies; therefore, Σ was set at a value just above the maximum difference between 
corresponding probabilities in these models. However, after running the initial tests, the 
effect of changing Σ can be measured on captures containing anomalies. The design goals 
for an optimal value of Σ are to 1) maximize detection of the attack and 2) minimize the 
number of anomalies that are not a result of the attack. 
a. Methodology 
In order to meet these goals, the repeat and sliding window detection algorithms 
were run with Σ values ranging from 0.0 to 0.06. The number of True Positive (TP) and 
False Positive (FP) results for each run were observed, and the precision value for each 
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calculated. A value for Σ was then chosen that maximized precision for all the detection 
algorithms. The equation for calculating precision [18] is shown in Eq. 2: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 =  𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃 + 𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃) (2)[18] 
To use precision, a method for counting TP and FP must be defined. The goal of 
the algorithms is to observe at least one probability anomaly due to the effects of the attacks 
present in each of the captures, and the attack is considered detected if one or more 
generated anomalies are the result of the attack. Therefore, when analyzing the anomalies 
observed by a detection method, if one or more of the anomalies are the result of the attack, 
true positives is set to 1. If none of the generated anomalies are a result of the attack, true 
positives are set to 0. False positives are determined by the number of generated anomalies 
that are not a result of the attack. 
It is worth noting that typically the tradeoffs between true positives, false positives, 
true negatives, and false negatives are show by comparing precision with recall [18]. 
However, since there is only one attack to detect in each capture, the maximum value for 
true positive is 1. Max value for false negative is also 1. Additionally, the attack is 
exclusive, i.e., if true positives are 1, false negatives must be 0, and if true positives are 0, 
false positives must be 1. When these limitations are observed with the recall equation 
shown in equation 3, it becomes apparent that the recall statistic does not add any new 
information in this case. 
 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =  𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃 + 𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝑁𝑁𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃) (3)[18] 
Since if true positives are 1, false negatives must be 0, recall is always 1 if the 
anomaly is detected, and always 0 if the anomaly is not detected. Precision is always some 
positive value if the anomaly is detected (true positive is 1), or either 0 or undefined if the 
anomaly is not detected (true positive is 0). Therefore, maximizing precision is sufficient 
for accomplishing both design goals and considering recall would not cause any change in 
the optimal value for Σ. 
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b. Test Selection and Results 
All of the false positive anomalies observed in the initial testing were are 
probability anomalies; therefore, only the IP series of tests were used for tuning the value 
of Σ, The methodology for optimizing Σ was performed using the IP2 and IP4 tests for the 
repeat and sliding window processing methods described in CH IV. An optimal value for 
Σ was chosen by comparing the results of these four tests as shown in Figure 41. Choosing 
IP2 and IP6 for Σ tuning provides one traffic capture with the attack present throughout the 
entire capture (IP2), and one where the attack results in a localized anomaly (IP6). Each 
capture was used with both the repeat and sliding window processing methods, as these are 
the two processing methods that generated the highest rate of false positive anomalies. 
Each of these four tests were run with a range of values for Σ, starting at Σ = 0 and 
incrementing by 0.002 until Σ = 0.06. The resulting precision values are shown in  
Figure 41. It is also worth noting that as the value for Σ increases, both the number of true 
positives and false positives could be 0. 
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Figure 41. Precision vs. probability tolerance factor results 
A Σ value of 0.024 produced the maximum precision value for the IP2 repeat, IP6 
repeat, and IP6 sliding window tests, and the second highest value for the IP2 sliding 
window test. While increasing Σ to 0.026 resulted in the maximum precision values for the 
IP2 repeat, IP2 sliding window, and IP6 sliding window tests, it also caused the IP6 repeat 
test to fail detecting the attack (shown by a precision value of 0). Since the highest priority 
design goal is to eliminate false negatives, a Σ value of 0.024 was chosen as the optimal 
value and used in all further tests. 
2. Alpha Filter Constant Tuning 
As described in Chapter IV, the alpha filter constant α is tuned by observing 
performance for a range of values and selecting an alpha filter constant value that results 
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in consistent detection of the attack while minimizing false positive anomalies. The 
observation traffic capture is split into segments by the interval size and then multiple 
generations of observation models are created using the DTMC modeling algorithm. In the 
repeat processing method, each of these generations of models are completely independent 
from each other, but the alpha filter processing method creates a filtered model by taking 
a weighted average of the previous generation’s filtered model’s transition matrix and the 
current generation’s unfiltered model’s transition matrix. The alpha filter constant 
determines the weight that is placed upon the previous generation’s transition matrix when 
computing this weighted average. As the alpha filter constant value approaches 0, each 
previous generation’s model has less effect than the current generation’s filtered model, 
until each generation is fully independent of the last generation and performance matches 
that of the repeat processing method. As the alpha filter constant value approaches 1, the 
previous generation’s model begins to dominate the current generation’s filtered model 
until each generation’s filtered model is a copy of the first generation’s model. Therefore, 
attacks are only detected if they are present in the first observation model created by the 
detection algorithm. The IP6 capture was chosen for this analysis because it contains a 
localized anomaly that the alpha filter method is expected to detect, and the anomaly is 
included in the middle of the capture to prevent the first filtered model from observing the 
anomaly. Table 20 shows the range of alpha filter constant values that were tested and the 
expected results, and Table 21 shows a summary of the actual results. 
Table 20. Expected results of alpha filter constant testing 
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Table 21. Results of alpha filter constant testing 
 
 
Unexpectedly, even an alpha filter constant of 0.05 resulted in failure to detect the 
attack. Further inspection of each generation of transition matrixes for test number 1 gave 
details as to why. Figure 42 shows the transition matrix for each generation as well as the 
transition matrix for NOP4 for comparison. 
86 
 
Figure 42. Alpha filter test transition matrixes 
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The red highlighted field in each of the matrixes shown in Figure 42 shows the 
transition probability for the transition from state 5 to state 4, and this transition probability 
is expected to cause the probability anomaly. This is the transition probability that most 
affected by the attack present in packets 321–640, and needs to differ from the 
corresponding transition probability in NOP4 by more than Σ = 0.024 to be detected. 
However, even with alpha constant value of 0.05, the difference between the filtered 
model’s transition probability and NOP4’s transition probability is 0.023; therefore, no 
anomaly was detected.  
The alpha filter processing method relies on two hyper-parameters, and both must 
be tuned simultaneously to achieve optimal results. The value of α affects the probability 
values in the filtered model, and the value of Σ determines if that probability is considered 
an anomaly. Therefore, the values for Σ and α must be tuned jointly to obtain the most 
effective result. For the same reasons discussed in Section V.B.1, precision was used as the 
classifier to measure performance. This test used values for α ranging from 0.1 to 0.9, 
increasing by 0.1, and values for Σ ranging from 0 to 0.6, increasing by 0.002. As with the 
Σ tuning in section V.B.1, this test was run on both IP2 and IP6 captures to provide data 
with attacks that are consistent throughout the capture and attacks that result in a localized 
anomaly. The contour plots for the IP6 and IP2 tests (Figure 43) show the precision values 
for each α and Σ pair as well as highlight the maximum precision value. 
 
Figure 43. Contour plots of precision vs. theta and alpha for IP6 and IP2 
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The maximum precision value for the IP6 test was 0.091 and occurred when α = 
0.1 and Σ = 0.018 – 0.022, and is highlighted in bright yellow on the contour plot. The 
maximum precision value for the IP2 test was 1.0 and occurred over multiple points, 
including when α = 0.4 and Σ = 0.034, α = 0.5 and Σ = 0.028-0.032, and α = 0.6 and Σ = 
0.028 – 0.030. This shows a large divergence in the optimal hyper-parameter settings 
between attacks that persist throughout the observation capture and attacks that result in a 
localized anomaly. In fact, the optimized α and Σ values from the IP2 resulted in failure to 
detect the attack present in the IP6 test. 
While it was expected that the alpha filter method using optimized hyper-
parameters would be able to detect attacks that result in a localized anomaly, the results 
showing worse alpha filter processing performance for attacks that resulted in a localized 
anomaly were not unexpected. The objective of applying the alpha filter is to reduce the 
variance in transition probabilities between each generation of model created by the 
detection algorithm. It was hoped that this variance reduction would be sufficient to reduce 
the number of false positives created by slight deviations between operations of the 
industrial cycle, while still retaining the capability to detect attacks that result in localized 
anomalies. However, the IP6 (localized anomaly in middle of capture) optimization test 
showed this was not the case as the optimal α value was a close to 0, resulting in 
performance that approached the operation and results of the repeat processing method. 
Additionally, the optimal Σ value shown in the IP6 α-and-Σ tuning test (0.022) was close 
to the optimized Σ value shown in section V.B.1 (0.024) and the maximum precision from 
this test (0.091) was the same as the maximum precision shown for the repeat processing 
method in section V.B.1 (0.091). Therefore, the alpha filter processing method did not 
provide any performance improvement over the repeat processing method when detecting 
attacks that resulted in localized anomalies.  
The alpha filter method did show performance improvement in other areas. The IP2 
precision vs. Σ-and-α test shown in Figure 43 shows a maximum precision value of 1.0, 
indicating successful detection of the attack with no false positives. The optimal repeat 
processing performance shown in section V.B.1 has a precision value of 0.5, indicating 
successful detection of the attack along with the presence of a false positive anomaly. This 
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suggests that when detecting an attack that is present throughout the capture the alpha filter 
method does offer the expected performance improvements. Therefore, when using the 
alpha filter method in further testing, values of α = 0.5 and Σ = 0.03 were used. These 
values were selected as they represent the median of the optimal range of values of α = 0.4 
– 0.6 and Σ = 0.28 – 0.32. 
C. UPDATED RESULTS 
Once the hyper-parameters for both the single-variable tests (batch, stream, repeat, 
sliding window) and the dual-variable test (alpha filter) have been optimized, the full set 
of tests presented in Chapter IV were performed. When observing results for each of these 
tests, two main factors were considered. First, if the attack was successfully detected, the 
result was considered a true positive. Second, each probability anomaly generated by a 
processing method would increase the count of the false positives for that test. As discussed 
in section V.B.1, precision is a metric that measures both of these, and since there in only 
one attack in each capture, the traditional method monitoring recall does not add any 
information to the comparative analysis. Performance for each of five anomaly detection 
methods were compared by observing the precision scores for each test. 
1. IS1 and IS2 Attacks 
Both the IS1 and IS2 attack are expected to create one or more new states in the 
observation model, and each detection algorithm is expected to detect these invalid states. 
Additionally, the creation of a new state in the observation model must result in the creation 
of at least one new transition and will possibly affect the probabilities of transitions to valid 
states. Therefore, transition and probability anomalies are expected to be generated as a 
result of the attack as well. Figure 44 shows the performance of each of the processing 
methods for the IS1 and IS2 attacks. 
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Figure 44. IS1 and IS2 attack detection results 
As shown in Figure 44, for the batch, stream, repeat, and alpha filter processing 
methods, each detected the attacks in both IS captures and have a precision value of 1.0, 
indicated no false positive anomalies. The sliding window processing method did 
successfully detect both attacks but did also have unexpected false positive anomalies. For 
the IS1 attack, the sliding window method returned two false positive anomalies, and for 
the IS2 attack it returned four false positive anomalies. Each of these false positive 
anomalies is a probability anomaly. With the exception of false positive anomalies from 
the sliding window processing method, each anomaly detection method performed as 
expected for each of these attacks. 
2. IT1 and IT2 Attacks 
Both IT1 and IT2 attacks are expected to result in creating a new transition in the 
observation models, and each detection algorithm is expected to successfully detect these 




Figure 45. IT1 and IT2 attack detection results 
As shown in Figure 45, each processing method did detect the attack, however only 
the batch processing method did so without any false positive anomalies for either attack. 
The stream processing method was the second-best performing algorithm, resulting in four 
false positives for the IT1 attack, and three false positives for the IT2 attack. The alpha 
filter processing method had similar performance to the stream method with four false 
positives generated for each attack. The repeat method had the worst performance in both 
attacks, with seven false positives anomalies in the IT1 attack and six in the IT2 attack. 
3. IP1, IP2 and IP3 Attacks 
The IP1-IP3 attacks are designed to cause a probability anomaly in their 
observation model by cycling the fill pump more than the NOP specification allows. All of 
them perform this cycling in each iteration of their respective procedure, but each test 
consists of a differing number of cycles in the attack. IP1 cycles the fill pump three times, 
IP2 cycles the fill pump five time, and IP3 cycles the fill pump ten time. Therefore, the IP1 
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attack is expected to be the most difficult to detect, and the IP3 attack should be the easiest 
to detect. Figure 46 shows the performance of the processing methods for the IP1, IP2 and 
IP3 attacks. 
 
Figure 46. IP1, IP2, and IP3 attack detection results 
IP1 is the first attack where a processing method failed to detect the attack. While 
the batch processing method did successfully detect the IP2 and IP3 attacks with no false 
positive anomalies, it failed to detect the IP1 attack. However, both the stream and alpha 
filter methods detected each attack with no false positive anomalies. Additionally, the 
repeat and sliding window algorithms successfully detected each attack, but also included 
several unexpected false positive anomalies. 
These results begin to confirm one of the hypotheses about the detection methods. 
While the batch processing method is able to successfully detect obvious attacks (invalid 
state, invalid transition) with minimal false positive anomalies, it can fail to detect more 
difficult types of attacks, as shown in IP1. 
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4. IP4-IP9 Attacks 
The IP4 through IP9 attacks are intended to create a probability anomaly by cycling 
the fill pump more than the NOP specification allows. Additionally, each of the attacks 
only occur in one of the five iterations of the NOP that make up the observation capture. 
This is intended to test each processing method’s ability to detect localized anomalies. IP4 
and IP5 conduct the attack in the first of the five iterations of the NOP, IP6 and IP7 conduct 
the attack in the third of the five iterations of the NOP, and IP8 and IP9 conduct the attack 
in the fifth of the five iterations in the NOP. The attack in IP4, IP6, and IP8 consists of five 
cycles of the fill pump, while the attack in IP5, IP7, and IP9 consists of ten cycles of the 
fill pump. Figure 47 shows the performance of the processing methods for the IP4-IP9 
attacks. 
 
Figure 47. IP4-IP9 attack detection results 
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As expected, the batch processing method failed to detect any of these attacks, and 
the stream processing method was only able to detect the attacks that resulted in a localized 
anomaly at the beginning of the capture (IP4 and IP5). Both the repeat and sliding window 
methods were able to detect every attack but produced a considerable number of false 
positive anomalies. The alpha filter method was able to detect the IP5 attack but failed to 
detect any of the other attacks. Based on the decisions made when tuning the alpha filter 
hyper-parameters, the inconsistent performance when detecting attacks that result in 
localized anomalies is expected. 
5. Interval Size Testing 
The IP6_int1 and IP8_int1 attacks are designed to compare the performance of the 
repeat and sliding window methods when the interval size causes the division between two 
of the observation models created by the processing algorithm to bisect the packets that 
contain the attack in the observation capture. This is expected to cause the attack on the 
observation models to be statistically diluted, resulting in the repeat processing method 
failing to detect the attack. The sliding window method creates more overlap between what 
portions of the observation capture are used to generate the observation model and is 
expected to detect these attacks. The results of the IP6_int1 and IP8_int1 attacks are shown 
in Figure 48. 
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Figure 48. IP6_int1 and IP8_int1 attack detection results 
The results of the IP6_int1 attack were as expected, with the repeat processing 
method failing to detect the attack, and the sliding window method successfully detecting 
the attack. The IP8_int1 attack was successfully detected by both detection algorithms. 
These results show that the expected performance failure of the repeat method is a 
possibility but is not guaranteed to occur. 
6. Scalability Testing 
Finally, a series of tests focusing on observing performance of the processing 
models as the observation capture size is scaled up were performed. The goal of these tests 
is to observe if the performance trends seen in the smaller-scale test generalize when data 
size is increased by one and two orders of magnitude. The best way to observe the outcome 
of these tests is to compare the number of false positive anomalies between the small-scale 
attack and the corresponding larger data scale tests. It is expected that the number of false 
positive anomalies are dependent on the number of comparisons between the training 
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model and the observation models generated by the anomaly detection algorithm. 
Therefore, increasing the size of the observation data set will result in increases of the 
number of false positive anomalies for the repeat, sliding window, and alpha filter methods. 
Given that batch processing algorithm only conducts one comparison between the training 
and observation model, increasing the size of the data set should not affect the number of 
false positive anomalies. While the stream processing algorithm involves multiple 
comparisons between observation and training models, the observation model is never reset 
during the comparison, resulting in the statistical dilution of effect from the packets added 
later in the observation capture. Therefore, it is expected to have performance similar to 
the batch processing method. Figures 49–53 show the number of false positive anomalies 
generated for each of scalability tests. A discussion of the results shown in these figures is 
provided after Figure 53.  
For all processing methods used in each test, increasing the size of the observation 
capture did not affect their ability to successfully detect the attack in any of the tests. If a 
given method detected an attack at the original scale, that attack was also detected in both 
the 10x and 100x scales. Likewise, if a method failed to detect an attack at the original 
scale, that attack remained undetected at both the 10x and 100x scales. 
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Figure 49. IS1 scaling false positive anomalies 
 
Figure 50. IT1 scaling false positive anomalies 
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Figure 51. IP2 scaling false positive anomalies 
 
Figure 52. IP4 scaling false positive anomalies 
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Figure 53. IP8 scaling false positive anomalies 
Overall, the results of each of the scalability tests were as predicted. All attacks that 
were successfully detected in the smaller scale tests were also successfully detected in the 
scalability tests, and no attacks that failed to be detected in the small-scale tests were 
detected in the scalability tests. Additionally, the relationship between false positive 
anomalies and data size for each processing method is also shown to be as expected. These 
results show that the number of false positives from the batch and stream processing 
methods are mostly independent of the size of the data, while the number of false positives 
from the repeat, sliding window, and alpha filter are correlated to the size of the observation 
data set. As the size of the observation data set increased by an order of magnitude, so does 
the approximate number of false positive anomalies. There are two outliers to this trend. In 
Figure 50 the number of false positives generated by the alpha filter processing algorithm 
does not increase with the size of the observation data set, and in Figure 52 the number of 
false positives generated by the stream processing method does increase with the size of 
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the observation data set. It is not clear as to why these two outliers exist, but every other 
scalability test shows the expected performance. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The goal of this thesis was to develop a sequence-aware IDS for an ICS system that 
uses ENIP and CIP as its application layer protocols, and to test five anomaly detection 
algorithms for the sequence-aware IDS. A method for using discrete-time Markov chains 
(DTMC) to develop a sequence-aware IDS was described by Caselli et al. [4], but to the 
best of our knowledge, their method has not yet been implemented on an ICS using ENIP 
and CIP protocols. Additionally, they only described one method (batch processing) for 
processing traffic captures into observation DTMC models for attack detection, and this 
method struggles with detecting some attacks that only occur over a small portion of the 
capture. This work implemented four additional methods for processing an observation 
traffic capture into a DTMC observation model for anomaly detection, and compared the 
performance of all five of these anomaly detection methods under several attack scenarios. 
All five anomaly detection methods successfully detected attacks that resulted in invalid 
state or invalid transition anomalies. However, only the newly proposed repeat and sliding 
window methods were able to constantly detect attacks that resulted in localized probability 
anomalies, and only the sliding window method was shown to do so when the packets 
containing the attack were divided into separate observation models by the interval size 
parameter. 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
A sequence-aware IDS that uses DTMC to model correct behavior of ICS 
components was implemented on the ICSICL testbed. This IDS was used to observe the 
performance of the batch processing method shown in [4] as well as the four processing 
methods proposed in this thesis (stream, repeat, sliding window, and alpha filter). These 
processing methods were used to detect attacks that would result in each of the three 
possible anomaly types, invalid state, invalid transition, and invalid probability. As 
expected, all processing methods were able to detect every attack that resulted in invalid 
state or invalid transition anomalies. Additionally, all methods were able to detect attacks 
that resulted in invalid probability anomalies if the attack was present throughout the entire 
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capture. However, if the attack resulting in an invalid probability anomaly only occurred 
over a portion of the observation, the batch processing method would fail to detect the 
attack. Of the newly proposed methods, only the repeat and sliding window methods were 
able to constantly detect attacks. Furthermore, the sliding window method could do so 
when the packets containing the attack were divided into separate observation models by 
the interval size parameter. 
1. Sequence-Aware IDS for ENIP and CIP Protocol 
A sequence-aware IDS that uses a DTMC to model behavior was successfully 
implemented on an ICS using ENIP and CIP protocols. Chapters II and III described how 
the ENIP and CIP protocols encapsulate data for transmission between components of an 
ICS, and how those protocols are specifically used in the ICSICL testbed. Since the ICSICL 
implementation uses undocumented vendor-defined ENIP and CIP services, we had to 
engineer the attacks based on PCAP analysis of the manual manipulation of the ICSICL 
components. Although our implementation of the sequence-aware IDS for ICSICL was 
shown to successfully detect sequence-based attacks, it is not generalizable to all systems 
running ENIP and CIP. 
2. Anomaly Detection Methods and Performance 
Four of the five probability-based anomaly detection methods, i.e., batch, stream, 
repeat, and sliding window processing, performed close to expectations. Each of these 
methods succeeded in detecting the attacks they were expected to detect but failed to detect 
the attacks they were expected to fail to detect. The alpha filter processing method did not 
meet expectations as discussed in the future work section. 
a. Batch Processing 
The batch processing method successfully detected every invalid state and invalid 
transition attack. Additionally, no false positive anomalies occurred in any of these tests 
(IS1, IS2, IT1, IT2). However, the batch processing method showed inconsistent 
performance when detecting probability anomalies. While the IP2 and IP3 attacks were 
successfully detected, batch processing was the only detection method that failed to 
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detected the IP1 attack. It also failed to detect any of the attacks that resulted in a localized 
anomaly (IP5-IP9).  
However, the batch processing method was the only method to never generate a 
false positive anomaly. Therefore, while batch processing is the worst method for localized 
probability anomaly detection, it offers the best performance in all other scenarios. For the 
attacks it was able to detect, batch processing had the highest precision values, and did not 
observe a false positive anomaly for any of the attacks. If it were not for its inability to 
detect attacks that resulted in a localized anomaly, batch processing would be the best 
anomaly detection method. 
b. Stream Processing 
The stream processing method successfully detected every invalid state and invalid 
transition attack. Similar to the batch processing performance, no false positive anomalies 
occurred in the IS1 and IS2 tests. While stream processing for the IT1 and IT2 attacks did 
result in false positive anomalies, it had the second-best performance with four and three 
false positives respectively. The stream processing method also detected each attack in IP1-
IP3 captures and did so with no false positive anomalies. However, out of the IP4-IP9 set 
of attacks, stream processing only detected the IP4 and IP5 attacks. This was expected due 
to the way stream processing builds the observation model. 
Overall, stream processing shows a small performance increase over batch 
processing when detecting localized anomalies, but is only successful if the anomaly is 
early in the capture. With the exception of the IT1 and IT2 attacks, stream processing 
detected other attacks with no false positive anomalies. 
c. Repeat Processing 
The repeat processing method successfully detected every invalid state and invalid 
transition attack. No false positive anomalies occurred in the IS1 and IS2 attacks, but repeat 
processing had the highest rate of false positive anomalies for the IT1 and IT2 attacks, with 
seven and six false positive anomalies respectively. 
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The repeat processing method is the first anomaly detection method to successfully 
detect every IP1-IP9 attack. This shows that the process of creating multiple observation 
models out of a single capture results in consistent detection of localized anomalies. 
However, this comes at the cost of a large number of false positive anomalies. At best, 
repeat processing resulted in two false positive anomalies for the IP4 attack, but at its worst, 
resulted in thirteen false positive anomalies during the IP7 attack. 
While repeat processing successfully detected the IP1-IP9 attacks, if the attack 
spanned the interval size used to divide the observation capture to generate separate 
observation models, it was possible to fail to detected the attack. This is shown with the 
IP6_int1 and IP8_int1 tests, where repeat processing failed to detect the IP6_int1 attack.  
Overall, repeat processing showed successful performance for all types of attacks, 
with the exception of the IP6_int1 attack, but due to the high number of false positive 
anomalies and the inability to detect the IP6_int1 attack, repeat processing is not the ideal 
anomaly detection method. 
d. Sliding Window Processing 
As with all other anomaly detection methods, sliding window processing 
successfully detected the IS1, IS2, IT1, and IT2 attacks. However, it is the only method 
that reported false positive anomalies in the IS1 and IS2 attacks.  
 Similar to the repeat processing method, the sliding window anomaly 
detection was able to detected the attack in IP1-IP9 tests. However, it had the highest 
number of false positive anomalies of any anomaly detection method for every IP1-IP9 
attack, with IP6 and IP7 resulting in seventeen false positive anomalies each. The sliding 
window processing method was the only method to successfully detect every attack that 
was tested, including the IP6_int1 and IP8_int1 attacks. However, this performance comes 
at the cost of a high number of false positive anomalies. 
e. Alpha Filter Processing 
The alpha filter processing method also successfully detected the IS1, IS2, IT2, and 
IT2 attacks. No false positive anomalies were observed in the IS1 or IS2 attacks, and four 
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false positive anomalies were observed in the IT1 and IT2 attacks, which are comparable 
to the results of stream processing.  
Alpha filter processing successfully detected each attack in IP1-IP3, and did so with 
no false positive anomalies. However, of the IP4-IP9 attacks, the alpha filter method only 
detected the IP5 attack. This shows similarity to the stream processing method, where 
localized anomaly can be detected if they occur early in the capture before being diluted 
by the continual additions of data to the observation model for stream processing. 
The original expectations for the alpha filter processing methods were not met. It 
was expected that the smoothing effect of the alpha filter would reduce the number of false 
positives when compared to the repeat and sliding window methods, while still enabling 
detection of attacks that result in localized anomalies. However, the hyper-parameter 
tuning for Σ and α showed that in order to best detect localized anomalies, the value for α 
needs to approach zero. When α = 0, the alpha filter method is functionally identical to the 
repeat processing method. Therefore, we concluded that the alpha filter method does not 
effectively detect attacks that result in a localized anomaly.  
However, the alpha filter method did show a considerable reduction in the number 
of false positive anomalies when compared to the repeat and sliding window methods in 
the IP1-IP3 tests. This shows that applying a signal processing filter is a viable method to 
achieve some reduction in false positive anomalies. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
This section discusses potential enhancements to improve anomaly detection 
performance of the prototype IDS, as well as improvements to the ICSICL testbed that 
would allow more complex testing of anomaly detection in ENIP and CIP traffic. 
1. Anomaly Detection Methods 
Overall, the performance of the alpha filter detection method was disappointing. 
We anticipated that the alpha filter processing would have the same advantages of the 
repeat and sliding window processing methods (ability to detect localized anomalies), 
while mitigating their disadvantages (false positive anomalies). However, the smoothing 
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effect of the alpha filter dominated any change in probability values caused by the localized 
anomalies, resulting in performance more comparable to the stream processing method. 
The alpha filter only tracks a smoothed mean of the distribution change. This research 
identifies the need to track velocity of change as well as the acceleration of the change in 
probability values. These more advanced filter architectures are known as alpha/beta or 
alpha/beta/gamma filters and should be investigated to potentially improve the alpha filter 
performance. 
2. Testbed Improvements 
Investigation of the ICSICL testbed revealed several factors that placed limitation 
on the prototype IDS implementation and experiment design. First, the current ladder logic 
program that manages the operations of the AFTL and DIOL does not send any component 
manipulation commands. Instead, the HMI sends a status request to the PLC every ~0.5 
seconds, and the PLC responds with a message that contains the current status of AFTL 
and DIOL components. This has two effects on the IDS. First, automatic operation of the 
AFTL and DIOL is not supported, and therefore manual operation of AFTL and DIOL 
components is necessary to cause a change in the data portion of the network 
communications. Second, having communications updates every 0.5 seconds, whether a 
component has been manipulated or not, results in the time spent in each state having a 
large effect on the transition probabilities for that state. When combined with manual 
operation, this introduces significant variation in the value of transition probabilities across 
models, even those where the same procedure was performed. It is possible that the 
combination of these two factors resulted in the high numbers of false positive anomalies 
seen during testing.  
The second limitation the current ICSICL implementation places on our IDS 
prototype is the use of vendor-defined service codes within the CIP protocol. These service 
codes are undocumented, which hampered our effort to create an IDS for a CIP 
implementation that is capable of observing system start-up and understanding how the 
communication manager of the CIP protocol choose to organize the location and sequence 
of the CIP service requests. This problem could be overcome by developing a ladder-logic 
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program for ICSICL that only uses the standard CIP service codes, using an actual ICS for 
modelling and testing, or entering a service contract with Rockwell Automation to obtain 
the definitions of the vendor-defined classes.  
Of these three options, developing a new ICSICL program offers additional 
benefits. A new ladder logic program for ICSICL could support automatic operation of the 
AFTL and DIOL components. This could produce two benefits. First, automatic operation 
of the AFTL and DIOL components would remove the human operator from the test 
generation process. Second, this automation would increase the number of tests that could 
be observed by the IDS, and reduce the variance in the time taken between each step of the 
NOP, resulting in having more data for analyzing the IDS performance, as well as 
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